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ABSTRACT 
What would the law do differently if it could see into the black box of 
the mind? One of the most valuable things it might do is reform the ways it 
deals with pain. Pain is ubiquitous in law, from tort to torture, from ERISA 
to expert evidence. Yet legal doctrines grapple with pain poorly, 
embodying concepts that are generations out of date and that cast 
suspicion on pain sufferers as having a problem that is “all in their 
heads.” 
Now, brain-imaging technologies are allowing scientists to see the 
brain in pain—and to reconceive of many types of pain as 
neurodegenerative diseases. Brain imaging proves that the problem is in 
sufferers’ heads: Long-term pain shrinks the brain and changes the way it 
functions. 
This new science has immediate practical and theoretical applications 
for the law. This Article first proposes reforms to disability law doctrines 
and their judicial interpretation. It then proposes ways in which pain 
neuroimaging ought to be handled as a matter of expert evidence in state, 
federal, and administrative proceedings. Drawing on work in evidence 
theory, it considers black letter evidence law as well as normative practices 
that shape how decision makers weigh evidence and credibility. It also 
offers limits on the use of brain images. 
In opening a window into how the brain generates subjective 
experiences, neuroimaging should lead to doctrinal and practice-based 
revisions that increase law’s accuracy and fairness. So doing, brain 
imaging should change the law’s mind about the nature of pain and may 
require the law to rethink its dualism between body and mind. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Pain is a legal, philosophical, and human conundrum. Pain is at once a 
physical state and an emotional experience, and thus exists at the nexus of 
body and mind; nowhere is the law’s casual dualism between mind and 
body more uneasily maintained than in questions of pain. Legal rights, 
proscriptions, and statuses turn on the presence or absence of pain, and its 
amount: Questions involving pain span legal domains from tort to torture, 
from constitutional law to administrative regulation. Pain accounts for 
hundreds of billions of dollars of direct economic costs and lost 
productivity annually—and yet, pain is largely invisible, unquantifiable, 
and often grossly misunderstood, leading to unnecessary suffering on the 
part of people whose pain is not credited and to unnecessary expense when 
the legal and medical systems function inefficiently or the wrong claimants 
are compensated. 
What would the law do differently if it could see pain, as is 
increasingly possible through new neuroimaging technologies? 
In important legal domains, the imaging of pain ought to change the 
law a great deal. This Article is about where law ought to change because 
of innovations in pain science brought about primarily through structural 
and functional imaging of the brain in pain. In the last two decades, 
structural and functional brain imaging, along with other brain- and non-
brain-based research modalities, have fundamentally transformed the way 
doctors and scientists understand chronic pain. From an elusive and 
speculative condition, often characterized by treating doctors and by the 
legal system as a form of hysteria, malingering, or fraud, researchers and 
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clinicians now understand many chronic pain conditions to involve 
neurological signaling disorders or to constitute brain disorders in 
themselves. 
This revolution in brain-pain sciences ought to change the law in at 
least two important areas that are the subject of this Article: disability and 
evidence law. Chronic pain is the single largest category of disability under 
the Social Security Disability (SSD) regime.1 Yet, the regulations about 
what constitutes disability are in places silent about pain and in other places 
confoundingly circular. Pain science, this Article argues, is now 
sufficiently developed for policymakers and scholars to improve the law’s 
treatment of pain in important ways, including to revise the SSD regime 
relating to chronic pain. 
If the current SSD regulations are lacking, judicial interpretations 
thereof have done little to improve them: In their efforts to gap-fill, circuit 
judges in federal courts across the United States, who hear appeals of 
administrative disability denials, have developed their own interpretations 
of when chronic pain can and cannot constitute a disability. These 
standards vary by circuit from under-defined and over-permissive to 
draconian. The same medical evidence leads to different outcomes based 
purely on where an appeal is taken, violating the principle of horizontal 
equity. 
Some judicial interpretations of the regulations express a view of the 
chronic pain claimant as suspect, as seeking recognition for emotional 
wounds in the guise of physical complaints. Judges and other 
commentators who hold such views are channeling a deep cultural current, 
as the history of pain in law and medicine is one of doubt about pain’s 
reality and of constructing the pain sufferer as hysterical. When apprised of 
new pain science, judges may choose a different approach to these cases: 
Circuit court judges are uniquely placed to change judicial interpretations 
of pain-related disability to conform with current science, so that their 
determinations can be more consistent and more fair, even before the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) revises its regulations. 
Chronic pain is also at issue in many litigated matters. These matters 
may sound in tort law, ERISA, disability law, or workers’ compensation. 
Accordingly, judges and jurors frequently need to evaluate evidence of 
chronic pain. Direct evidence relating to a claimant’s medical condition is 
already common in these kinds of proceedings. This Article argues that 
expert testimony grounded in pain neuroimaging, and neuroimages 
themselves, ought to be admissible for certain limited purposes: to educate 
judges and jurors about the nature of chronic pain conditions and to inform 
 
1.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2012). 
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them as to the causes, manifestations, and likely prognoses for these 
conditions. 
Evidence, although notionally a rule-based enterprise, is highly 
normative. Determinations about what evidence is relevant and reliable, 
and thus admissible, take place against background expectations or 
schemas: How well does the evidence presented match what the decision 
makers expect to see and believe to be credible? Evidence embraces the 
narrative character of the trial and extends to the evaluative process of 
judges and juries. These “soft” aspects of evidence may be more influential 
than the rules themselves in shaping litigation and its outcomes. 
Background expectations or schemas may be informative; they also may 
mislead. In cases involving chronic pain, jurors and judges alike may hold 
mistaken beliefs about chronic pain’s causes, presentation, and persistence. 
Introducing educative evidence about chronic pain could have a debiasing 
role, equivalent to steps some jurisdictions have taken to permit expert 
testimony debunking other common but erroneous beliefs, like the now-
discredited beliefs about the infallibility of eyewitness identification. 
Drawing on narrative theory, evidence theory, and behavioral 
economic accounts of decision making, this Article recommends ways in 
which neuroimaging evidence could improve accuracy in trials by changing 
the background or default expectations of judges and fact finders. Turning 
to black letter or “hard” aspects of evidence law, this Article argues that 
aggregate pain neuroimaging evidence ought to be admissible under the 
federal, state, and administrative evidence regimes for certain, limited 
purposes. However, brain imaging technology is not a pain-o-meter or a 
mind-reading machine. Rather, it is a tool for increasing the law’s 
understanding about how the brain works and how the law can do better at 
adjudicating important questions that lie at the intersection of the brain, 
body, and mind. 
 
*** 
 
Part I of this Article describes three problems that legal regimes have in 
adjudicating claims relating to chronic pain: visual bias, the doctrine of 
“excess pain,” and doctrines and norms that confuse chronic pain disorders 
with psychiatric hysterical disorders. These problems show the state of the 
law itself and also of legal culture and norms relating to chronic pain. 
Examining court opinions, legal doctrines, and other sources of legal 
culture, it shows how antiquated or mistaken notions about chronic pain 
affect legal decision making and lead to suboptimal outcomes. It points 
toward the ways in which the neuroimaging advances in pain science can 
begin to address these issues. 
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Part II presents current research on chronic pain as a set of 
neurologically involved disorders. Focusing on structural and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), it surveys the field and incorporates 
information from interviews with leading pain researchers. 
Parts III and IV turn to the ways in which this new science should 
change two key areas of legal doctrine and practice. Part III analyzes Social 
Security Disability regulations, showing how current neuroimaging 
research could resolve significant doctrinal and applied problems. It 
outlines proposals to reform regulations that define when chronic pain 
constitutes disability, to modify judicial interpretations of the regulations, 
and to educate adjudicators about pain science. 
Part IV turns to evidence law. Exploring evidence law theory, it shows 
how narrative expectations, culturally received norms, and cognitive 
predispositions like confirmation bias contribute to poor outcomes for 
chronic pain claimants and shows how pain neuroimaging could be used to 
modify decision makers’ beliefs and perceptions. Going beyond the black 
letter law, the normative analysis in this section has implications for 
proceedings in tort, ERISA, and a range of other types of claims. The 
section concludes by proposing where neuroimaging should, and should 
not, be admissible. 
I. THREE PROBLEMS OF PAIN IN LAW 
Pain arises as a problem, and problematically, in some of the most 
important and ubiquitous areas of the law: federal and state administrative 
law, particularly Social Security Disability and workers’ compensation 
regimes; federal and state disability law; the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA);2 and tort. Claimants come to the legal forum to 
allege that their pain disables them partially or totally from working, that 
their insurer has wrongfully misclassified them as not disabled or denied 
them coverage for needed pain treatments, that their employer has failed to 
make a reasonable accommodation for their condition, or that a defendant’s 
negligence wrongfully caused the claimant to suffer ongoing and possible 
future pain. Pain is not only legally pervasive but staggeringly costly: 
Chronic pain costs the U.S. economy $635 billion each year in medical 
costs and lost productivity;3 government disability benefits, including 
benefits to people disabled by pain, amount to approximately $130 billion;4 
 
2.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2012)). 
3.  INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH 91 (2011). 
4. Disability Insurance Benefit Payments, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4a6.html (last visited May 8, 2014). This figure represents all 
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and pain and suffering damages in tort, although hard to estimate reliably,5 
may amount to $50 billion per year.6 
These kinds of cases present the usual difficulties that the legal system 
faces in adjudicating any matter: Decision makers must assess the strength 
of the parties’ claims, including the weight of their evidence and their 
credibility. Yet, cases involving claims of pain also present unique 
problems, problems embedded in the fabric of the law and also in the 
norms, expectations, and practices of legal decision makers relating to 
questions of pain. 
This Part focuses on three problems relating to pain in the law: courts’ 
emphasis on the wrong kinds of evidence of pain; the doctrine of “excess 
pain” and its implicit or shadow notion of reasonable pain; and the notion 
that chronic pain, particularly pain that is not linked to obvious tissue 
damage or anatomical abnormalities, is the product of psychiatric illness. 
These problems, significant in themselves, point more generally to the 
kinds of problems that recur throughout black letter law and legal culture in 
cases involving claims of pain. These illustrative issues are interrelated in 
that they individually and collectively show the law’s interest in visual 
corroboration of pain; its struggle to understand seemingly inexplicable 
variation in pain across individuals; and, at times, a suspicion of pain 
claimants as a category. 
A. Doubt About Pain and the Search for Visual Evidence 
Courts struggle with questions relating to the reality and verifiability of 
chronic pain and appear to struggle in particular with the invisibility of 
pain. Pain’s invisibility is its famous problem: As the seminal scholar on 
pain, Elaine Scarry, explained, pain “may seem to have . . . no reality 
because it has not yet manifested itself on the visible surface of the earth.”7 
Adjudicators may reject well-substantiated claims where the claimant does 
not offer visual medical evidence like X-rays or MRIs, even though such 
technologies are often irrelevant to pain diagnosis.8 Conversely, when 
adjudicators look at X-rays, MRIs, and other visual evidence that does 
 
payments to qualifying people with disabilities; this is not a figure for payments exclusively to people 
disabled by chronic pain. Breakdowns of benefits payments by disability type are not available. 
5.  See Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain 
and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 235–37 n.84 (1993) (asserting that “all 
of the published empirical studies of pain and suffering awards should be viewed with great suspicion 
as to their reliability, validity, and meaning”). Vidmar analyzes the factors that make rigorous estimates 
difficult in this area and that contribute to the inaccuracy of existing ballpark estimates. 
6.  John Fabian Witt, The Political Economy of Pain, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF WILLIAM E. NELSON 235, 237 (Daniel J. Hulsebosch & R.B. Bernstein, eds. 2013). 
7.  ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 3 (1985). 
8.  See infra notes 63–71 and accompanying text. 
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not—and cannot—show pain, they use these images as corroboration for 
their intuition that pain not tied to a visible problem does not exist: If the 
image does not show it, it must not be real. 
In Minor v. Commissioner of Social Security, the claimant alleged 
disability due to lifelong chronic headaches exacerbated by a closed-head 
trauma sustained in a high-speed car accident.9 She underwent dozens of 
hospitalizations, several spinal and brain surgeries, and the implantation of 
a spinal pain modulator.10 She also submitted evidence of some thirty 
diagnostic tests supporting her diagnoses.11 The administrative law judge 
denied her claim, and the district court affirmed, with both courts noting 
that Minor’s claims of crippling headache and back pain were not credible 
because she did not present MRIs or “venograms” showing gross brain 
damage.12 However, as the appellate court noted, MRI and venogram data 
would be irrelevant to demonstrating the kinds of pain the claimant alleged, 
a fact to which the Agency’s own examining expert testified.13 Similarly, in 
Ketelboeter v. Astrue, the court rejected the claimant’s assertion of severe 
chronic pain because X-rays did not “corroborate[] the claimed increase in 
[chest] pain that [the claimant] reported over time,” although it would be 
the rare form of chest pain that would show up on an X-ray.14 
Judges’ findings that claimants did not have disabling pain because 
they had no abnormal X-rays or similar imaging shows their search for the 
smoking gun (a crushed pelvis, a bulging disc), the visible thing that causes 
the pain. This manifests an attachment to the superseded “peripheral injury 
model.”15 
This emphasis on visual proof stems, too, from an aspect of our visual 
culture, a kind of “naïve visual realism” in which, “[i]f seeing is believing, 
having something to look at offers a reliable ground for belief, so visual 
evidence is the best sort of evidence there is.”16 Professor Neil Feigenson 
explains that, in areas where judges or jurors review visual evidence, they 
become “overconfident in their [own] interpretations . . . and less receptive 
to alternative viewpoints”; further, reviewing such evidence—or the 
absence of such evidence where the evidence is expected—serves to 
“entrench the effects of other, first-order biases.”17 
 
9.  513 F. App’x 417, 418–22 (6th Cir. 2013) (reciting history below). 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. at 425. 
12.  Id. at 431, 433 (reversing holding below). 
13.  Id. at 435–36. 
14.  550 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2008). 
15.  See infra Part II.A (discussing peripheral and central models of chronic pain). 
16.  Neal Feigenson, Visual Common Sense, in LAW, CULTURE AND VISUAL STUDIES 105, 108 
(Anne Wagner & Richard K. Sherwin eds., 2014). 
17.  Id. at 105. 
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Put more simply, judges or jurors will see what they expect to see when 
visual evidence is presented, consistent with prior beliefs (“first-order 
biases”);18 and if they expect to see visual evidence that is not forthcoming, 
they will draw adverse inferences that are also consistent with those prior 
beliefs. A judge or juror may believe that most back pain is caused by 
spinal abnormalities (it is not). If a claimant alleges disabling back pain, 
that decision maker would expect to see X-rays or MRIs showing a 
deformed spine. If the claimant’s evidence shows normal spinal anatomy, 
the decision maker will not be “receptive to” alternative explanations for 
the pain and may dismiss other supportive (but not visual) medical 
evidence.19 
Neuroimaging may help by showing brain alterations and atrophy 
associated with chronic pain. This is not to say that brain imaging can 
prove chronic pain in the same way that an X-ray can prove a broken leg. 
Neuroimaging is not a pain-o-meter and is not suitable as individual proof 
of pain. Rather, as discussed in Parts II and III, imaging can show decision 
makers that pain has a brain-based, biological reality independent of 
peripheral damage, giving a visual basis to believe in the reality of pain 
while taking away the expectation that a “pain picture” will correlate the 
degree of pain to the degree of damage. 
B. The Reasonable Pain Standard and the Problem of “Excess Pain” 
“Excess pain” is the legal term of art decision makers apply when they 
find that a claimant is alleging more pain than is thought to be typical for 
the claimant’s disease or injury and, further, that the level of pain is not 
supported by objective medical tests like X-rays.20 No source of law 
defines the ostensibly correct or non-excessive amount of pain for each 
condition; indeed, the SSA itself explicitly recognizes that pain can be 
subjective and variable.21 Thus, in the absence of concrete guidance about 
reasonable or typical pain, initial and reviewing judges are left to make the 
 
18.  Id.; see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the 
Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 17 (1998) (describing the definitive history on the 
conflicted early acceptance and ultimate triumph of photographic evidence in the courtroom). 
19.  Visual culture in evidence law is an area of study in its own right. In addition to the Wagner 
& Sherwin volume, supra note 16, interested readers should see generally Mnookin, supra note 18, and 
Christopher J. Buccafusco, Gaining/Losing Perspective on the Law, or Keeping Visual Evidence in 
Perspective, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 609 (2004). 
20.  Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Standard and Sufficiency of Evidence When Evaluating 
Severity of Claimant’s Pain in Social Security Disability Case Under § 3(a)(1) of Social Security 
Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d)(5)(A), 165 A.L.R. FED. 203, § 3 (2000) 
(defining “excess pain” as “pain that is unsupported by objective medical findings,” such as X-ray); see 
also, e.g., Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986) (defining “excess pain” as pain 
beyond the level typically associated with a particular medical condition) (internal citation omitted). 
21.  SSR 88-13, 1988 WL 236011 (July 20, 1988). 
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determination of whether a claimant’s pain is unreasonable in relation to 
the claimant’s injury or disease. They make this determination based in part 
on medical evidence submitted in the case, but also based on their own 
judgment against the background of what they know or believe about the 
degree of pain caused by different conditions.22 
Judges vary tremendously in what they consider to be excess pain for 
particular conditions. While some judges do credit that different people 
experience pain very differently, others suspect that high levels of alleged 
pain implicitly raise a presumption of exaggeration, fraud, or even 
psychiatric problems.23 This leads to heightened scrutiny of evidence 
corroborating the claimant’s alleged level of pain and, frequently, adverse 
credibility determinations about the claimant. 
Garcia v. Colvin illustrates the discretion vested in judges to determine 
whether pain is reasonable or excessive in relation to the claimed 
conditions.24 It also shows the uncertainty and suspicion adjudicators may 
bring to cases they characterize as involving excess pain. In Garcia, the 
claimant presented with lupus, colitis, sickle cell disease, Hepatitis C, 
abdominal hernia, and terminal cirrhosis of the liver.25 He had been taken 
off the liver transplant list because doctors determined that he could not 
survive transplant surgery.26 Garcia’s doctors and an Agency-appointed 
examiner concluded Garcia was completely disabled.27 
An ALJ determined that Garcia was complaining of “excess pain” 
because, in the judge’s view, his pain exceeded typical levels for his 
various conditions.28 On that basis, the ALJ concluded that Garcia was “not 
credible,” and further dismissed Garcia’s partner’s testimony that Garcia 
frequently awoke screaming from pain as “self-serving.”29 The court 
concluded that claimant “must have been exaggerating” because he did not 
consistently seek pain-relief treatment; however, Garcia, an unemployed 
laborer, only failed to seek treatment during the times when he lacked 
health insurance.30 After Garcia exhausted his administrative appeals, a 
federal district court affirmed.31 
 
22.  Wooster, supra note 20, at § 3 (describing judicial process). 
23.  See infra Part I.C. 
24.  741 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2013). 
25.  Id. at 759. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. The ALJ further concluded Garcia’s pain could not be as severe as Garcia claimed 
because Garcia could “rise . . . to a standing position, . . . and [] walk heel to toe” in a brief examination. 
Id. at 761. 
30.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
31.  Id. (citing the district court opinion). 
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The Seventh Circuit eventually reversed, severely criticizing the 
judgment exercised by the lower courts.32 This case might be viewed as a 
one-off; there are occasional mistaken outcomes in every area of law. 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, per Judge Posner, 
used Garcia as an opportunity to criticize what the court described as a 
general problem with excess pain cases: that of administrative courts 
dismissing claims of excess pain with “boilerplate language” and of failing 
to credit well-substantiated and independent evidence of pain because the 
adjudicators found the level of pain claimed to be unreasonable.33 
Garcia is an extreme case,34 but not an isolated one.35 It demonstrates 
general problems with the doctrine and the concept of excess pain: First, 
there is no general or typical amount of pain that particular conditions 
produce. As presented in Part II, pain scientists and clinicians forcefully 
reject the notion of a typical or standard pain experience; the same injury 
can heal completely in one individual while producing lifelong pain in 
another.36 The legal standard regarding “excess pain” invites decision 
makers to decide for themselves how much pain is legitimate for any given 
condition, turning a medical determination into a normative and credibility 
determination. This opens the door to a wide range of judicial perspectives 
and degrees of knowledge about the subjective variability of pain and 
perhaps to view individuals who claim unreasonable pain (a medically 
nonsensical concept) as unreasonable people. 
C. Pain as Mental Disorder in Sources of Legal and Cultural Authority 
Numerous legal regimes treat mental and physical disorders differently, 
privileging physical disorders. In some cases, courts have held that chronic 
pain that lacks an obvious, visible cause (like bulging discs in the spine) is 
not physically real but instead is a “mental disorder.”37 Aspects of disability 
doctrine also construe this kind of pain—pain not linked to a visible cause 
 
32.  Id. at 758. 
33.  Id. at 765. 
34.  On review, the appellate court described itself as “astonished” at the lower courts’ 
determinations, and “surprised that the [Justice Department] would defend such a denial.” Id. at 762–
63, 765. 
35.  See, e.g., Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing the district court’s 
conclusion claimant had “excess” pain; noting adjudicator may not substitute own judgment about how 
much pain is appropriate for a particular injury); Shavin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 488 F. App’x 
223 (9th Cir. 2012); Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2009); Hawkins v. First Union Corp. 
Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2003). 
36.  See infra at notes 67–71 and accompanying text (explaining that some people who sustain a 
peripheral injury will develop central nervous system sensitization that causes chronic pain). 
37.  Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d 794, 
799 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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or lesion—to be psychiatric in nature.38 The conclusion that pain is a 
“mental disorder” can make it not compensable under ERISA, as in the 
case of Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote 
Technology, Inc.39 The judicial conclusion that certain forms of chronic 
pain are mental disorders leads to other problems as well: adjudicators have 
held that chronic pain patients whose pain arises from mental disorder are 
“flamboyant” exaggerators whose pain can only be credited if one believes 
in a “medical fantasyland” where the unreal is magically real.40 
Practice guides, too, perpetuate these negative characterizations. 
Writing for The Social Security Reporter, an important journal of 
administrative law, an ALJ advises other judges hearing cases involving 
chronic pain to consider first the possibility of “converted mental 
conflict.”41 Whether a claimant suffers from “organic” pain versus 
“psychogenic” pain “should influence adjudication of entitlement quite 
differently.”42 In this judge’s view, psychiatric pain should not be 
compensable; “rewarding” the claimant for the psychiatric condition only 
perpetuates the person’s disability rather than forcing him or her to 
confront and fix the disability’s emotional causes. 
Other authoritative sources reinforce these views. Treatises like 
American Jurisprudence play an important role as repositories of legal 
culture and sources of norm transmission. Current editions continue to 
repeat nostrums about chronic pain that are a half-century or more out of 
date. Among the first things that American Jurisprudence Proof of Facts 
has to say in its section entitled “Modern physiopsychological concepts of 
pain sensations” is that “the subconscious needs of the plaintiff-patient” 
can cause him or her to “exaggerate pain”43 out of a subconscious “desire” 
to be a victim.44 Chronic pain conditions that do not arise from an obvious 
injury, it states, may indicate major mental illness.45 Complaints of chronic 
pain may, it states, be the way that an emotionally afflicted individual 
“call[s] for help.”46 
A judicial determination that pain is psychiatric has important legal, 
social, and practical implications. Tort law, among other areas of law, treats 
 
38.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
39.  125 F.3d at 799. 
40.  Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2004) (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
41.  Patrick D. Halligan, Credibility, Chronic Pain, and Converted Mental Conflict: Some 
Distinctions for Adjudicators, 38 SOC. SEC. REP. SER. 859, 859 (1993) (containing the advice of an 
administrative law judge of the SSA serving in Wisconsin). 
42.  Id. at 859. 
43.  I. Alfred Breckler, Whether a Plaintiff Has Sustained Pain & Suffering, in 23 AM. JUR. 2D 
Proof of Facts § 3 (2007). 
44.  Id. § 10. 
45.  Id. § 3, at 11. 
46.  Id. at 12. 
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mental and physical disorders differently, privileging physical disorders.47 
The conclusion that pain is a “mental disorder” can make it not 
compensable under ERISA, as in the case of Lang, where the employer’s 
insurance plan provided coverage for physical but not psychiatric 
disability.48 It can cause a claimant to be denied certain medical treatments 
that would be indicated for physiologically generated pain but not for pain 
that is the product of psychiatric conversion. Finally, there is the social 
stigma of being labeled as mentally ill. The message is chronic pain may be 
a manifestation of major mental illness, or at least of a neurotic enjoyment 
of victimhood. 
This view that people who suffer (or complain of) chronic pain are 
malingering or neurotic, or enjoy victimhood, although represented in legal 
culture, does not originate in legal culture. Legal culture has received such 
views from earlier work in various branches of medicine, particularly from 
psychoanalysis. Under the psychoanalytic view, chronic pain exists 
because the hysterical subject unconsciously produces symptoms as an 
expression of his or her psychological need. The subject has some 
emotionally painful conflict that she cannot confront; the repressed conflict 
manifests itself as a physical symptom, through a process called 
“somatization” (literally, embodiment).49 
Chronic pain and psychoanalytic theory are intimately linked: Indeed, 
the famed Anna O. sought treatment with Josef Breuer in part to help 
resolve her chronic pain symptoms.50 Breuer and Sigmund Freud made her 
case the centerpiece of their foundational work Studies on Hysteria, tracing 
 
47.  GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 217–20 (1970) (discussing the relative 
treatment of physical versus emotional harms in tort); see also Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible 
Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV. 772, 778–80 (1985). 
48.  125 F.3d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 1997). 
49.  The definition of somatization is itself in a state of flux and controversy. The traditional 
definition emphasizes its psychiatric character as well as the flamboyant presentation of people who 
receive this diagnosis: “Somatization disorder is a psychiatric condition marked by multiple medically 
unexplained physical, or somatic, symptoms. . . . [Patients] often use impressionistic and colorful 
language to describe their symptoms. . . . While many symptoms resemble those associated with 
genuine diseases, some of the symptoms reported by people with somatization disorder are not.” 
Somatization disorder, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MENTAL DISORDERS, http://www.minddisorders.com/Py-
Z/Somatization-disorder.html#ixzz2vVhL8JZY (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). The National Institutes of 
Health offers a more contemporary and less disparaging description of somatization, stating that 
somatization is a “condition in which a person has physical symptoms that involve more than one part 
of the body, but no physical cause can be found.” It describes somatization as currently undergoing a 
reappraisal in which clinicians are identifying disorders of pain perception that lead to the diffuse and 
nonspecific pain claims typical of patients labeled as somatizers. Somatization Disorder, MEDICINE 
PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000955.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
50.  Bertha Pappenheim, described as Anna O. in Breuer’s case study, sought treatment for 
paralysis, head and neck pain, and fugue states. The case has “bedeviled the history of psychiatry ever 
since and has been the object of every conceivable diagnosis.” Edward Shorter, What Was the Matter 
with Anna O.?, in FREUD UNDER ANALYSIS 23, 24 (Todd DuFresne & Paul Roazen eds., 1997). We 
may never know “what was the matter with Anna O.,” but we may still explore the influence of this 
document on the history of medicine, law, and culture. 
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her chronic pain to repressed psychic conflict.51 The Anna O. case also 
embodies the magic trick of the talking cure: Breuer claimed that once 
Anna O. identified and articulated her emotional conflicts, her physical 
symptoms disappeared. Breuer’s claim was false: The real patient, named 
Bertha Pappenheim, continued to suffer for many years but ultimately 
learned to live with her pain.52 She went on to do important work, in spite 
of great physical pain, in progressive politics, advocating for greater rights 
for workers and children.53 Few remember Bertha Pappenheim, while the 
literary construction known as Anna O. remains famous. 
Part of the legacy of the Anna O. story is the enduring construction of 
pain, particularly female pain,54 as fantasized and hysterical. It tells 
decision makers to view the person who complains of pain as suspect and 
emotionally disordered and cautions them not to fall into the trap of 
“rewarding” the claimant by believing the pain is real, as this reinforces the 
“syndrome.” 
Although the notion that psychological conflict could produce physical 
symptoms did not originate with Freud and his school,55 it found its fullest 
expression and broadest acceptance through Freud’s writings.56 Early 
members of Freud’s school asserted that a patient would convert psychic 
distress into a bodily (“somatic”) symptom, relabeling what Freud 
originally called “conversion hysteria.”57 
Somatic disorder and conversion disorder remain psychiatric 
diagnoses, although of steeply declining popularity: The DSM-IV-TR 
cautions that these are uncommon conditions that ought not to be diagnosed 
unless all non-psychiatric medical causes can be ruled out and only where 
the pain anatomical distribution or symptoms do not follow any known 
 
51.  JOSEF BREUER & SIGMUND FREUD, STUDIES ON HYSTERIA 21 (1957). 
52. Bertha Pappenheim, “Anna O” (1859–1936), SCIENCE MUSEUM, 
www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/broughttolife/people/berthapappenheim.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2015). 
53.  Marion A. Kaplan, Bertha Pappenheim: Founder of German-Jewish Feminism, in THE 
JEWISH WOMAN: NEW PERSPECTIVES 149, 150–53 (Elizabeth Koltun ed., 1976). 
54.  See generally Sónia F. Bernardes & Maria Luísa Lima, On the Contextual Nature of Sex-
Related Biases in Pain Judgments, 15 EUR. J. PAIN 950 (2011) (studying bias in perceiving female pain 
and finding that in certain cases women’s pain was perceived as less credible than men’s pain). 
55. ANNE HARRINGTON, THE CURE WITHIN: A HISTORY OF MIND-BODY MEDICINE 54–60 (2009) 
(describing the work of Jean-Martin Charcot, a teacher of Freud’s, on the development of the idea of the 
unconscious); Malcolm MacMillan, Jean-Martin Charcot, in The FREUD ENCYCLOPEDIA: THEORY, 
THERAPY, AND CULTURE 75, 75–80 (Edward Erwin ed., 2002). 
56.  Describing the hysterical invalid, Freud asserts: “Her state of ill-health will have every 
appearance of being objective and involuntary—the very doctor who treats her will bear witness to that 
fact; and for that reason, she will not need to feel any conscious self-reproaches . . . .” The Clinical 
Picture, in VII THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND 
FREUD, 44–45 (1954–73). 
57.  Harold Merskey, The History of Pain and Hysteria, 8 NEUROREHABILITATION 157, 159 
(1997) (describing history of the term “somatization”). 
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medical criteria.58 This represents a marked shift from DSM-III, which did 
not express any caveats or cautions; the transition from DSM-III to DSM-
IV shows the trend in psychiatry and general medicine to resist describing 
most forms of chronic pain as “all in the patient’s head.”59 New 
neuroimaging technologies now enable researchers to understand chronic 
pain as “in the patient’s head” in a much more literal and less dismissive 
way: As a set of pathologies grounded in central nervous system 
processing, as described in Part II. 
II. CURRENT PAIN SCIENCE AND THE POTENTIAL OF NEUROIMAGING 
Brain science can now begin to show why certain relatively trivial 
injuries may give rise to what looks like “excess” pain, why injuries that 
have apparently healed may result in lifelong pain, and why some people 
develop primary chronic pain disorders in the absence of any injury at all. 
Structural imaging of the brain in pain shows that particular chronic pain 
conditions result in the reshaping of certain brain structures, with the 
degree of brain difference (or damage) correlating with the amount and 
duration of the sufferer’s pain. Functional imaging shows reorganization in 
the brain’s default network, how the brain engages in unconscious activity. 
Moreover, these observed structural and functional changes are 
explanatory: The regions affected map onto the symptomatology that 
researchers observe and of which patients complain. Chronic pain is, as its 
sufferers have known all along, painfully real. This section describes the 
state of pain science and points toward the proposals for its legal 
application that will be described in Parts III and IV. 
A. Chronic Pain: An Overview 
The myriad varieties of physical pain all fall into two categories: acute 
or chronic. Acute pain is sudden in onset and relatively brief in duration.60 
It follows the familiar nociceptive model: the body experiences an injury or 
insult (a sprained ankle, a burst appendix); nerves in the affected area relay 
signals to the spinal cord and brain; and the brain sends back the message 
“pain!” This kind of pain is adaptive: It signals that the organism needs to 
pay attention to something right now. Because acute pain is caused by 
peripheral input to the spinal cord and brain, once the peripheral injury 
 
58.  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 
DSM-IV-TR 446 (4th ed. rev. 2000). 
59.  Harold Merskey drove the change from DSM-III to DSM-IV. See Harold Merskey, Pain 
Disorder, Hysteria or Somatization?, 9 PAIN RES. & MGMT. 67, 71 (2004). 
60.  K.P. Grichnik & F.M. Ferrante, The Difference Between Acute and Chronic Pain, 58 MT. 
SINAI J. MED. 217 (1991). 
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resolves, the pain goes away. Most physical pain is acute pain, and most 
acute pain resolves relatively quickly. 
Chronic pain is fundamentally different. Even though chronic pain is 
typically defined as pain lasting three to six months or more,61 it is not just 
long lasting acute pain. Rather, chronic pain often has “a life of its own”:62 
it often does not depend on continued peripheral input. It may endure long 
after any injury has healed, may be entirely out of proportion to the original 
(sometimes trivial) injury, or may arise in the absence of any injury. 
Many severe chronic pain disorders are “primary,” meaning the pain is 
itself the disease; it does not derive from (is not “secondary to”) any other 
condition or injury. Primary chronic pain conditions include some of the 
most common sources of work absenteeism, doctor visits, and general 
misery: chronic lower back pain and headache. While some chronic back 
pain is traceable to mechanical issues like impinged nerves or spinal 
abnormalities, most abnormal findings are merely incidental; correcting 
bulging discs, for example, frequently does nothing to alleviate the pain.63 
Similarly, most headache conditions are not symptoms of “something else,” 
like a tumor or vascular abnormality. The abnormality is in the central 
nervous system—a kind of “always on” setting in the brain or a 
hypersensitivity to ordinary signals. 
Other chronic pain syndromes may originate with a peripheral injury, 
but the pain then “chronifies.” In pain chronification, the peripheral injury 
heals or appears to heal completely but severe pain persists.64 Common 
forms of chronified post-injury pain include post-surgical pain, complex 
regional pain syndrome, and phantom limb pain. If a patient is fortunate, 
his or her pain may be amenable to peripheral intervention.65 But for the 
most part, interventions at the location where the person experiences the 
pain make the pain worse, not better, because the brain itself is generating 
the false sensation of local pain.66 
Some chronically painful conditions, like irritable bowel syndrome or 
advanced arthritis, are associated with ongoing peripheral disease. But 
 
61.  JUDY FOREMAN, A NATION IN PAIN: HEALING OUR BIGGEST HEALTH PROBLEM 3 (2014). 
62.  Peter Croft et al., Chronic Pain as a Topic for Epidemiology and Public Health, in CHRONIC 
PAIN EPIDEMIOLOGY: FROM AETIOLOGY TO PUBLIC HEALTH 3, 5 (Peter Croft et al. eds, 2010). 
63.  Such pain may be managed or, in some patients, resolved; however, manipulations or 
interventions in the back itself often have no impact on the pain condition. 
64.  David Borsook et al., Neuroimaging Revolutionizes Therapeutic Approaches to Chronic 
Pain, 3 MOLECULAR PAIN art. no. 25, at 2 (2007). 
65.  A. Lee Dellon et al., Treatment of the Painful Neuroma by Neuroma Resection and Muscle 
Implantation, 77 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 427, 434 (1986). 
66.  See, e.g., Ronald Melzack et al., Central Neuroplasticity and Pathological Pain, 933 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 157, 162–63 (2001) (discussing denervation hypersensitivity; reporting that 
surgical nerve resection can lead to increased pain due to neuronal activity in the somatosensory 
system). Cf. id. at 163–67 (noting that improved surgical techniques, including administration of local 
anesthesia to nerves to be resected, may improve such outcomes). 
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peripheral input causes only part of patients’ pain: Patients with these 
conditions develop neurologically altered pain perception, leaving them 
with both peripheral disease and a central pain-processing disorder.67 
Chronic pain, whether primary or secondary, both causes and results 
from a phenomenon called “central sensitization,” in which the brain 
reorganizes its upward and downward modulation of pain signals.68 Over 
time, over-activity in these neural regions reshapes the brain, a process 
called “neuroplasticity.” Chronic pain sufferers develop atrophy and 
hypertrophy in brain regions involved in pain signal transmission and in the 
affective processing of pain.69 The longer a person suffers chronic pain, and 
the more intense the pain, the greater the degree of volume loss (atrophy) is 
observed in these brain regions. This time-dependent, pain-dependent 
atrophy leads some researchers to speculate that chronic pain is a 
neurodegenerative disease.70 Although the mechanisms underlying pain-
related neuroplasticity remain under investigation, researchers agree that 
chronic pain changes the brain and does so progressively over time.71 
This model of chronic pain as a central nervous system disorder is quite 
new. In Kuhnian fashion, it marks a paradigm shift away from the prior 
peripheral injury model.72 It is puzzling that the peripheral injury model 
endured for so long, in light of its general failure to explain the distress and 
match the symptomatology of many forms of chronic pain. It may have 
been able to endure so long because studies of the central nervous system 
were not developed enough to provide an alternative account for the 
symptoms doctors encountered. It also may have endured in part because 
the theory of psychogenic pain, and background norms relating to hysteria, 
allowed physicians to explain away apparently anomalous cases.73 The 
 
67.  Sean C. Mackey & Fumiko Maeda, Functional Imaging and the Neural Systems of Chronic 
Pain, 15 NEUROSURGERY CLINICS N. AM. 269, 269–70 (2004) (identifying chronic low back pain, 
irritable bowel syndrome, and complex regional pain syndrome as having significant centralized 
involvement); see also Stephen E. Gwilym et al., Psychophysical and Functional Imaging Evidence 
Supporting the Presence of Central Sensitization in a Cohort of Osteoarthritis Patients, 61 ARTHRITIS 
CARE & RES. 1226 (2009). 
68. See generally Melzack, supra note 66; see also Chronic Pain Medical Treatment Guidelines, 
CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. REL. 3–4 (2009), 
http://www.dir.ca.gov/dwc/DWCPropRegs/MTUS_Regulations/MTUS_ChronicPainMedicalTreatment
Guidelines.pdf (“[C]hronic pain . . . involve[s] changes in central pain processing mediated through 
mechanisms of neural plasticity and ultimately leading to hyper-excitability of central structures . . . .”). 
69.  Arne May, Chronic Pain May Change the Structure of the Brain, 137 PAIN 7, 8–9 (2008). 
70.  Borsook et al., supra note 64, at 2 (stating that chronic pain “must be considered as a chronic 
degenerative disease . . . producing an altered brain state”) (citing A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic 
Back Pain Is Associated with Decreased Pre-frontal and Thalamic Gray Matter Density, 24 J. 
NEUROSCI. 46 (2004); A. Kuchinad et al., Accelerated Brain Gray Matter Loss in Fibromyalgia 
Patients: Premature Aging of the Brain?, 27 J. NEUROSCI. 15 (2007)). 
71.  Melzack et al., supra note 66, at 167–69. 
72.  See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 118 (3d ed. 1996). 
73.  See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text. 
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peripheral injury model required—to state the obvious—a causal peripheral 
injury. When physicians found no injury or no relationship between a 
peripheral injury and the complained-of pain, they came to the (apparently) 
ineluctable conclusion that the patient’s pain resulted from no physical 
cause.74 This conclusion, in turn, was buttressed by the readily-available 
theories of hysteria and conversion.75 
The contemporary model that gives priority to brain-based processes 
may not be the last word in pain science, and the field continues to evolve; 
but, it has vastly more explanatory and predictive power than the prior 
model. The sections below detail particular neuroimaging technologies and 
what they currently show (and cannot show) about chronic pain conditions. 
B. Structural Neuroimaging Shows Changes in Pain Sufferers’ Brains 
1. Overview of Structural Neuroimaging 
Magnetic resonance imaging generates a three-dimensional, highly 
detailed representation of hard- and soft-tissue bodily structures.76 MR 
images can show whether there are structural abnormalities within the 
imaged area; many readers will have direct experience of this through 
having had an MRI of the knee or lower back. MR images also show the 
volume of particular areas, allowing for the volume of the same structure to 
be compared across subjects. 
This volumetric comparison of different brain regions shown on an 
MRI is performed using a mathematical technique known as “voxel-based 
morphometry,” or VBM.77 Just as a flat screen is comprised of pixels, 
locations within the three-dimensional MR-image space are designated by 
volumetric pixels, called “voxels.”78 Standardizing a voxel map over brain 
images allows researchers to compare the volumes of brain regions across 
subjects or within one subject over time.79 
 
74.  Rollin M. Gallagher, Secondary Gain in Pain Medicine: Let Us Stick with Biobehavioral 
Data, 3 J. PAIN 274, 274 (1994) (describing physicians’ tendency to fall back on explanations of 
somatization and secondary gain, “[t]he concept behind the use of the term seemed simple: without a 
known biomedical cause, the symptom must be psychiatric”). 
75.  See supra notes 49–59 and accompanying text. 
76.  Despite the verisimilitude of the MR image, an MR image is a computer-generated 
composite constructed from data. DONALD W. MCROBBIE ET AL., MRI FROM PICTURE TO PROTON 1 
(2003). 
77.  Arne May & Christian Gaser, Magnetic Resonance-Based Morphometry: A Window into 
Structural Plasticity of the Brain, 19 CURRENT OPINION NEUROLOGY 407, 408 (2006). 
78.  Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE 
869, 871 (2008). 
79.  The typical voxel in an MR brain image is about nine cubic millimeters. Id. 
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Studying the shape and size of brain regions—the brain’s 
“morphometry”—using voxel-based comparisons enables a range of 
studies exploring the impact of various conditions on brain size and 
structure.80 “Neuroplasticity”—the way the brain remodels itself response 
to experience—has practically become a household word over the last 
decade, in part because VBM can now show, noninvasively, how people’s 
brain regions grow, shrink, or reorganize.81 
2. Brain-Based Changes Reflect Duration, Severity, and Type of Pain 
Three decades ago, Elaine Scarry famously wrote in The Body in Pain 
that “physical pain” seems to have “no reality because it has not yet 
manifested itself on the visible surface of the earth.”82 She described pain’s 
invisibility as causing it to be “that which cannot be denied and [yet] that 
which cannot be confirmed.”83 Structural neuroimaging now shows that 
distinct chronic pain conditions produce characteristic patterns of structural 
brain alteration, with the degree of visible brain alteration correlating with 
the duration, severity, and kind of chronic pain. These findings lend reality 
and specificity to chronic pain conditions: Although the sensation of pain 
remains invisible, pain creates visible traces in the body. Through these 
technologies, pain now is “visible [on the] surface of the earth”;84 it is now 
“that which cannot be denied and that which cannot [can now] be 
confirmed.”85 
The groundbreaking work that first showed the relationship between 
chronic pain and regional brain atrophy was conducted by Vania Apkarian, 
a professor of neuroscience at Northwestern University. In 2004, Apkarian 
showed that chronic back pain is associated with decreased grey matter 
density in the prefrontal cortex and thalamus of the brain.86 The core 
finding of this paper appeared to be: Chronic pain equals brain loss; more 
pain equals more brain lost.87 
Numerous prominent researchers have confirmed and extended these 
findings. Professor Arne May, one of the world’s leading researchers on the 
structural neuroimaging of headache pain, reports that VBM studies show 
 
80.  May & Gaser, supra note 77, at 407. 
81.  Id. at 408–09. 
82.  SCARRY, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
83.  Id. at 4. 
84.  Id. at 3. 
85.  Id. at 4 (alteration and emphasis added). 
86.  A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Back Pain Is Associated with Decreased Prefrontal and 
Thalamic Gray Matter Density, 24 J. NEUROSCIENCE 46 (2004). 
87.  See, e.g., A. Vania Apkarian et al., Pain and the Brain: Specificity and Plasticity of the Brain 
in Clinical Chronic Pain, 152 PAIN S49, S55 (2011); Borsook et al., supra note 64, at 2 (stating chronic 
pain “must be considered as a chronic degenerative disease”). 
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significant changes in grey matter in patients with chronic headache, 
chronic back pain, and phantom limb pain.88 The more grey matter a person 
has lost, the more sensitive he or she becomes to pain.89 In a meta-review 
of the burgeoning research on structural pain imaging, May reports that 
chronic pain most frequently leads to atrophy in the frontal lobes, followed 
by atrophy in the cingulate cortex and the insula.90 Similarly, David 
Borsook, a Harvard-based pain researcher, has reported characteristic 
structural, functional, and molecular changes in brain regions in patients 
with chronic neuropathic pain, complex regional pain disorder, and 
fibromyalgia.91 This ability to determine which parts of the brain are 
compromised by specific chronic pain conditions “revolutionizes 
therapeutic approaches to chronic pain” by helping achieve diagnostic 
specificity and pointing toward neurological targets for intervention.92 
C. Functional Neuroimaging in Chronic Pain 
Distinct chronic pain conditions correlate with distinct structural brain 
changes, as described above. Researchers are exploring whether particular 
types of chronic pain correlate with specific functional patterns of activity 
in sufferers’ brains. The answer, preliminarily, is yes: Functional 
neuroimaging shows that different pain conditions are associated with 
characteristic patterns of brain activity. This section introduces how 
functional brain imaging works and then describes how functional imaging 
studies contribute to understanding chronic pain disorders. 
1. Overview of Functional Neuroimaging 
The main technology for imaging the brain in pain is functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This revolutionary technology allows 
researchers to glimpse and approximate in real time the activity of the brain 
that corresponds to varied kinds of action and experience. Using fMRI, 
researchers can start to understand which regions of the brain are involved 
 
88.  Arne May, Neuroimaging: Visualizing the Brain in Pain, 28 NEUROLOGICAL SCI. S101, S104 
(2007). 
89.  Nichole M. Emerson et al., Pain Sensitivity Is Inversely Related to Regional Grey Matter 
Density in the Brain, 155 PAIN 566 (2014). 
90.  Arne May, Structural Brain Imaging: A Window into Chronic Pain, 17 NEUROSCIENTIST 
209, 212 (2011) [hereinafter May, Structural Brain Imaging]; see also Arne May, New Insights into 
Headache: An Update on Functional and Structural Imaging Findings, 5 NATURE REVS. NEUROLOGY 
199, 205 (2009) [hereinafter May, New Insights into Headache] (reporting volumetric changes in the 
insula, brain stem, and hypothalamus as characteristic of various primary headache syndromes). 
91.  Borsook et al., supra note 64, at 4. 
92.  Id. at 1. 
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in perceiving and experiencing acute pain, and in experiencing and 
generating chronic pain. 
fMRI works by indirectly indicating where the brain is using more 
energy.93 The brain is constantly active, and certain regions of the brain 
preferentially become active when a person engages in a particular task or 
thought process.94 Usually, many regions become active together, because 
the brain is a highly interconnected system.95 When brain regions become 
more active, their metabolic demands go up: they need more oxygen and 
glucose, which are delivered by increased blood flow. 
When an MRI machine sends magnetic pulses through the subject’s 
brain, it can detect these changes in blood flow.96 The magnetic pulses are 
not distorted by oxygen-rich blood, but deoxygenated blood distorts the 
magnetic wave slightly.97 This creates the “blood oxygenation level-
dependent,” or BOLD, signal.98 Researchers generate a composite picture 
of which regions in the brain show increased or decreased blood flow 
during a task or experience.99 It is important to understand that fMRI is not 
a photograph of brain activity. Instead, it is like looking at a map of where 
a city uses energy, which can indicate where the city is bustling and where 
it is sleepy. 
In investigating acute pain and chronic pain conditions, fMRI has 
proven revelatory. Irene Tracey, an Oxford University-based scientist, was 
the first to use fMRI to image the brain in pain. She has shown not only 
which regions of the brain process acute pain, but also that subjective self-
reports of acute pain correlate with the degree of activity in the subjects’ 
brains.100 That is, the phenomenology of pain matches the physiological 
degree of response to pain, a fascinating empirical contribution to 
philosophical debates on perception. Researchers have used fMRI to show 
functional brain reorganization in patients with chronic pain,101 and have 
 
93.  See, e.g., Nikos K. Logothetis, The Underpinnings of the BOLD Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Signal, 23 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3963, 3963 (2003). 
94.  Id. 
95.  John T. Cacioppo et al., Just Because You’re Imaging the Brain Doesn’t Mean You Can Stop 
Using Your Head: A Primer and Set of First Principles, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 650, 651 
(2003); see also, e.g., Matthew Brett et al., The Problem of Functional Localization in the Human 
Brain, 3 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 243, 243 (2002) (detailing problems with using fMRI to 
localize complex and interconnected brain functions). 
96.  John A. Detre, Clinical Applicability of Functional MRI, 23 J. MAGNETIC RESONANCE 
IMAGING 808, 808–09 (2006). 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. at 809. 
100.  Irene Tracey & Patrick W. Mantyh, The Cerebral Signature for Pain Perception and its 
Modulation, 55 NEURON 377, 383 (2007). 
101.  May, supra note 88, at S104–05 (showing functional reorganization in headache 
syndromes; degree of reorganization correlates with degree of pain and impairment). 
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even shown that particular types of functional reorganization are 
characteristic of distinct chronic pain conditions.102 
fMRI has important limitations, however. First, it has temporal 
limitations: Blood flow may precede neural activity—or it may lag 
behind.103 Spatially, the signal from blood vessels may not be precisely 
where the neural activity is taking place.104 Third, there is a great deal of 
normal variation in brain response in a single subject (person) across 
different trials, and lots of variation between subjects.105 An fMRI showing 
the response to a particular stimulus like pain is an average—an average of 
many trials of one subject and an average of many trials across different 
subjects. The composite fMRI showing what “the brain” does in response 
to, say, a painful heat stimulus may not look exactly like any single scan of 
any subject’s brain in that experiment.106 
2. fMRI as Objective Measure of Pain? 
When fMRI studies have created a robust composite of average brain 
activity in response to a particular stimulus (say, acute pain), then 
researchers can use software to compare an individual brain scan to the 
composite and make an educated guess about whether the individual is 
experiencing the same thing.107 Could fMRI pattern classification provide a 
“pain-o-meter” to help legal actors improve trial outcomes and better 
manage systems at risk for fraud? 
A team of researchers led by Sean Mackey at Stanford University have 
developed an fMRI protocol that can determine in most cases whether a 
subject in an fMRI scanner is experiencing acute pain.108 In a paper 
tantalizingly entitled, Towards a Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: 
Patterns of Human Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful 
Thermal Stimulation, the authors assert that their findings demonstrate that 
fMRI “can assess pain without requiring any communication from the 
 
102.  May, Structural Brain Imaging, supra note 90, at 211, Figure 2 (reporting functional 
imaging findings of headache syndromes; showing distinct brain regions become active during pain 
attacks in the various syndromes). 
103.  Nikos K. Logothetis & Josef Pfeuffer, On the Nature of the BOLD fMRI Contrast 
Mechanism, 22 MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 1517, 1524 (2004). 
104.  Id. 
105.  Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the 
Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 275 (2007). 
106.  Id. 
107.  Justin E. Brown et al., Towards a Physiology-Based Measure of Pain: Patterns of Human 
Brain Activity Distinguish Painful from Non-Painful Thermal Stimulation, 6 PLOS ONE e24124, at 2 
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0024124 (describing 
machine learning paradigm, developed in the Mackey lab at Stanford). 
108.  Id. at 7. 
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person being tested.”109 This work has been refined and extended by Tor 
Wager, whose recent work in the New England Journal of Medicine 
showed that fMRI could detect acute pain in normal, healthy subjects with 
ninety-five percent accuracy.110 
This major research accomplishment looks like a pain-o-meter, but it is 
not.111 Even if this protocol worked perfectly in predicting acute pain (and 
it currently has a relatively high rate of error), it would be of limited use 
relative to chronic pain, as these conditions present themselves very 
differently neurologically. Further, acute pain can be produced in the lab; 
chronic pain may or may not be present—and may be present at varying 
intensities—at the time of a test. Apart from pain detection, though, fMRI 
can detect changes in the “default-mode network,” or patterns of 
background activity, of chronic pain sufferers’ brains.112 This finding helps 
explain perceptual, cognitive, and affective impairments that occur in these 
conditions.113 Perhaps in the future, fMRI of the default network may have 
diagnostic potential, helping categorize patients, plaintiffs, or claimants. 
III. NEUROIMAGING SHOULD INFLUENCE DOCTRINE AND INTERPRETATION 
IN DISABILITY LAW 
The new science of chronic pain, particularly neuroimaging of chronic 
pain, should lead to modifications to the Social Security Disability 
regulations and, in the near term, to judicial reinterpretation of the existing 
regulations. This Part first presents the SSDI regulations and the 1984 
Amendment to those regulations, which were intended to provide 
adjudicators with greater guidance on how to evaluate claims grounded in 
chronic pain. 
While regulatory reform may proceed slowly, federal judicial 
interpretation of the existing regulations could evolve without delay to 
incorporate new scientific knowledge. After exploring the regulations, this 
section turns to how judges in different circuits interpret and apply the 
SSDI regulations. Judicial interpretations vary considerably from circuit to 
circuit, incorporating a range of understandings of chronic pain—some of 
which are loose and unbounded, while others are unrealistically narrow and 
 
109.  Id. at 1. 
110.  Tor Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1388, 1388 (2013). 
111.  Brown et al., supra note 107, at 5 (“We are still very far from a physiology-based pain 
assessment tool that could be used in clinical, forensic, and other applied settings.”). 
112.  Marwan N. Baliki et al., Beyond Feeling: Chronic Pain Hurts the Brain, Disrupting the 
Default-Mode Network Dynamics, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 1398 (2008) (using fMRI to show default-
mode network changes in chronic pain). 
113.  Id. 
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restrictive. The variability not only fails to comport with pain science but 
violates horizontal equity, as similarly-situated claimants may receive 
different outcomes depending only on the circuit in which their cases 
proceed. And, it imposes costs on the system: Circuits that use an under-
defined standard may increase the likelihood of fraud and abuse, while 
those that use a harsh and unrealistic standard may frustrate the purposes of 
the Act. This Part proposes ways in which judicial interpretation of the 
existing regulations ought to change to incorporate new scientific 
knowledge about chronic pain. 
A. Social Security Disability Doctrine and Practice Relating to Chronic 
Pain 
Disability, under the Social Security Disability Insurance program 
(SSDI), often turns crucially on pain—whether the claimant is in pain, and 
whether that pain is intense, constant, and traceable to an objectively 
identifiable medical condition.114 Although only about one in five Social 
Security claimants receives benefits pursuant to the Disability program, 
determining whether claimants in fact are disabled “now constitutes the 
major part of [the SSA’s] workload.”115 The SSA receives about 600,000 
hearing requests annually, a large percentage of which involve claims of 
chronic pain.116 
Yet, the disability law regime has struggled with the problem of pain 
since its inception. Despite its prominence as a cause of disability, “chronic 
pain” is not defined within the Social Security Administration’s 
regulations. As a result of the Act’s silence on pain, early cases litigated 
under the Act held as a matter of law that pain could not be disabling.117 
This principle changed in 1961, when the Fifth Circuit held in Butler v. 
Flemming that chronic pain could constitute a disability under the Act.118 
The Butler principle spread rapidly; eventually, every circuit recognized 
that pain could render a person disabled within the meaning of the Act.119 
 
114.  See Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) 
(2012). 
115.  Administrative Review Process for Adjudicating Initial Disability Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 
16,424, 16,424 (Mar. 31, 2006) (emphasis added); see also Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social 
Policy, and Social Security’s Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 
191 (2007) (describing the toll on administrative resources of adjudicating disability claims). 
116.  Bloch, supra note 115, at 192 (providing figures). 
117.  See, e.g., Adams v. Flemming, 276 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1960); Coomes v. Ribicoff, 209 
F. Supp. 670, 672 (D. Kan. 1962); Littleton v. Ribicoff, 210 F. Supp. 711, 714 (E.D. Ky. 1962). 
118.  288 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1961). 
119.  I.J. Schiffres, Pain as “Disability” Entitling Insured to Disability Benefits Under § 103 of 
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 423), 23 A.L.R.3d 1034, § 5[b] (2014) (describing Butler 
precedent; collecting cases). 
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Such pain must arise from a “medically determinable physical or mental 
impairment.”120 
This double-edged recognition of pain as disabling, but only when it 
arises from a distinct or determinable impairment, endures today. Chronic 
pain cannot serve as a valid category of disability unless the pain is caused 
by some condition separate from the pain itself—such as rheumatoid or 
osteoarthritis giving rise to pain, or back injury giving rise to pain, and so 
forth. Claimants who cannot point to a known medical condition capable of 
giving rise to pain cannot be found disabled based on pain—with one 
exception. That exception is psychogenic or somatized pain. 
Since the disability regime’s inception, the drafters of the disability 
regulations and the judges who interpret them have recognized that 
disabling pain does frequently occur independently of a disabling injury or 
obvious disease. To provide compensation to claimants who appeared to 
demonstrate genuine suffering but who could not show evidence of a 
distinct injury or disease, ALJs and federal judges arrived at the work-
around of finding such claimants psychiatrically disabled. Claimants with 
chronic pain thus could qualify as disabled if they could receive a diagnosis 
and a finding of a psychiatric pain condition, generally either psychogenic 
pain, “somatoform pain disorder,” or “conversion disorder.” This allows 
for financial recovery in some cases. However, it also reinforces the notion 
that chronic pain is hysterically generated—and it affords no recovery to 
people suffering from chronic pain who do not also demonstrate the 
symptoms necessary for a suitable psychiatric disorder. The rest of this 
section explores in detail these issues under the regulations. 
1. Legal Framework: Statutory and Regulatory Regime 
Under the Social Security Disability Act (the Act), disability insurance 
(DI) is available to any person with a “disability” who is an “insured” 
under the Act and who is under the age of 65.121 Similarly, under the Social 
Security Insurance (SSI) program established in the same Act, benefits are 
available to people who are both indigent and disabled. The Act defines 
disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.”122 
The impairment, further, must “be expected to result in death or which has 
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months.”123 
 
120.  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
121.  § 423(a)(1). 
122.  § 423(d)(1)(A). 
123.  Id. 
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Within the meaning of the Social Security Act, a condition (like pain) 
can be “disabling” if it results from “a medical impairment” that could 
“reasonably be expected” to cause the kind and degree of impairment 
alleged.124 Medical proof is built into the statutory regime: The claimant 
must provide “[o]bjective medical evidence”125 showing a “medically 
determinable” impairment,126 and the associated disability must “result[] 
from anatomical [or] physiological . . . abnormalities” that are 
“demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 
techniques.”127 The Act is implemented through federal regulations that 
require a claimant to provide objective evidence of a condition, “which 
could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms 
alleged.”128 
Neither the Act nor its implementing regulations define disabling pain 
nor list disabling pain conditions.129 In the absence of such guidance, 
administrative and Article III courts have struggled over time to determine 
how to adjudicate an increasing caseload of pain-based claims. Courts have 
found particularly challenging the subjective and variable nature of chronic 
pain, as well as claimants’ assertions that they suffer chronic pain in the 
absence of an obvious, ongoing injury.130 
2.  The Problematic 1984 Regulations: Pain as Symptom of 
“Something Else” 
As a result of ongoing judicial confusion and inconsistency, Congress 
revisited the question of DI/SSI pain evaluation guidelines in the early 
1980s.131 In 1984, Congress issued new guidelines amending the Act that 
ostensibly instructed courts how to proceed in evaluating chronic pain 
claims.132 The 1984 Amendment lays out a three-part inquiry, codified and 
elaborated in SSA regulations. Under the Amendment and the regulations 
 
124.  § 423(d)(5)(A). 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. 
127.  § 423(d)(3). 
128.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (2014); see also § 416.929(b). 
129.  Schiffres, supra note 119, § 5[b]. As a result of the Act’s silence, early decisions under the 
Act held that pain could not be disabling. Id. (collecting cases). 
130.  SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN 26 (1987) (discussing congressional action, noting and 
describing “the diversity of court rulings” on this point); see also, e.g., Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270 
F.3d 715, 721–23 (8th Cir. 2001) (reversing ALJ’s finding that the record did not corroborate subjective 
complaints of pain); see also Schiffres, supra note 119, § 9 (discussing how the trier of facts should 
evaluate subjective pain). 
131.  SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 130, at 26. 
132.  Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) 
(2012). 
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derived from it, the claimant first must show by “by medically 
acceptable . . . diagnostic techniques” that he suffers a “medical 
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological 
abnormalities.”133 This showing of medical causation is “a threshold 
requirement; a sine qua non” of any valid claim.134 Second, the fact finder 
must determine that the abnormalities could “reasonably be expected to 
produce the pain” to the degree complained of.135 If the pain is more severe 
or longer lasting than would be typical for the underlying impairment, then 
the ALJ is instructed to examine other evidence bearing on the degree of 
the claimant’s pain and his resulting impairment. Third and finally, the 
medically-demonstrable pain must reasonably “lead to a conclusion that the 
individual is under a disability,”136 meaning that the pain must preclude the 
claimant from engaging in “any substantial gainful activity.”137 
The Amendment and related regulations attempt to define when pain is 
legally disabling. Yet, when read narrowly, these provisions do not define 
pain as a legally disabling condition at all. Rather, the SSA recognizes as 
disabling any underlying medical impairments that reasonably and actually 
cause severe pain, not pain itself. The first step of the inquiry is a threshold 
showing of some “anatomical, physiological, or psychological 
abnormalit[y],” and the second step is the determination of whether such 
abnormality could be “reasonably [] expected to produce the pain.”138 Pain 
is thus conceived of as the output of the disease state or abnormal 
condition. Thus, under the Act, pain cannot itself be the basis of a claim of 
disability. 
This distinction between pain as a symptom versus pain as a disease in 
itself might seem recondite. But it has enormous importance: The Act 
perpetuates the conception of pain-as-symptom, pain as derivative. Instead, 
as discussed in Part II, chronic pain often is a disease in itself. Chronic pain 
without lesion may be associated with abnormal biomarkers and brain 
states, yet currently there is no known cause for many chronic pain 
conditions or for why apparently healed peripheral injury can continue to 
be associated with pain. This matters legally because it means that chronic 
 
133.  Id. 
134.  Bloch, supra note 115, at 234 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a)); see also, e.g., 
Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted) (stating that the initial consideration must be whether there is “objective medical evidence of 
an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain”); Johnson v. 
Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 657 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating the same). 
135.  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); see also SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 130, at 
14. 
136.  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). 
137.  § 423(d)(1)(A). 
138.  § 423(d)(5)(A). 
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pain often is not—as required by the Act—demonstrably the product of 
another impairment or condition. 
If under the guidelines the pain must be “produced by” another 
condition, then adjudicators face the problem of seemingly uncaused 
chronic pain, where the suffering is obvious but its sources are not. Many 
judges have tried to interpret the requirement that pain arise from another 
condition generously, so that it comports with their general intuition that 
chronic pain can be real in the absence of an evident injury or with their 
particular assessment of a claimant as sincere in his or her suffering.139 
What judges have fallen back upon in the absence of a convincing 
mechanism to explain chronic pain has been the notion that chronic pain is 
a real disorder, but of psychiatric origin.140 
Following the 1984 amendments, many judges started to do what some 
handful of them had done before: find that claimants are disabled by 
“psychogenic pain” or by the closely related psychiatric diagnosis of 
“somatoform pain disorder” (SPD), the modern heir to the old diagnosis of 
hysteria.141 Psychogenic pain and SPD have been the savior and the 
nemesis of chronic pain claimants: savior, because these diagnoses 
provides legal and medical recognition and financial compensation for 
unexplained pain; nemesis, because shoe-horning chronic pain into these 
psychiatric diagnoses carries several negative consequences. First, the 
claimant has to meet the burden of producing convincing evidence of 
psychogenic pain or SPD, which he may not be able to offer if his 
condition is not psychiatric in origin. Second, a claimant’s categorization as 
suffering from psychiatric pain may limit his or her access to medical 
interventions that would be contraindicated for psychiatric pain. Treatment 
flows from diagnosis: If the diagnosis is that a person’s chronic pain arises 
from repressed emotion, then an insurer might reimburse comparatively 
inexpensive psychiatric medication but might deny coverage for 
interventional procedures like nerve blocks. Finally, if the claimant is 
successful, he or she then labors not only under the disability of pain but 
also the stigma of a psychiatric diagnosis. 
B. Improving SSDI Regulations with New Pain Science 
Although a claimant need not provide courts with “objective evidence 
of pain,” she must (reasonably enough) provide “objective evidence of a 
 
139.  See, e.g., Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 754–55 (7th Cir. 2004). 
140.  See, e.g., Davis v. Califano, 599 F.2d 1324, 1326–27 (5th Cir. 1979) (remanding for further 
factfinding to determine if the claimant’s pain was “psychosomatic”). 
141.  See, e.g., Sanders v. Sullivan, 983 F. 2d 822 (8th Cir. 1992); Farris v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., 773 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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medical condition which could cause the pain alleged.”142 Yet, if current 
descriptions of pain chronification mechanisms are accurate, then much 
chronic pain will occur in the absence of any separate or distinct 
“condition” that “produce[s] the pain,” other than the chronic pain 
condition itself.143 At least as currently discernible by medical science, 
there may be no obvious anatomical abnormality, no peripheral smoking 
gun. 
It sounds circular to say that pain is the symptom of the disease of pain, 
which reasonably can be expected to produce pain. But the appearance of 
circularity is merely semantic. It disappears if the relationship between the 
experience of pain and the condition giving rise to it is reconceptualized 
like this: Chronic pain may be produced and maintained by neurological 
alterations, which modify the brain’s functional patterns and structure. This 
type of central nervous system sensitization may arise in conjunction with a 
peripheral injury or disease; it may endure after a peripheral injury heals; or 
it may arise in the absence of any peripheral cause, as with primary 
headache syndromes.144 
To bring the regulations in line with the current state of medical 
knowledge about pain chronification, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b) and 
404.1529(b) should be amended to recognize that chronic pain can persist 
after an initial trauma, injury, or disease has actually or apparently 
resolved. There are several ways that this amendment could be 
implemented. I suggest that the language of the regulations be amended to 
read: “objective evidence of a medical condition, including chronic pain 
conditions, that could cause the pain alleged . . . .” This language would 
incorporate into the regulations the reality that chronic pain is a medical 
condition—a neurological disorder of diverse etiology but fairly uniform 
mechanism—characterized by abnormal activation of areas of the brain 
related to pain perception and generally independent of any peripheral 
input. 
Alternatively, the language of the regulations could remain as it is, but 
an advisory committee or other body within the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) could promulgate an interpretive memorandum 
that defines chronic pain as an independent medical condition that satisfies 
the definition set forth in the regulations. This memorandum should 
communicate the contemporary medical-scientific model of chronic pain as 
involving both peripheral and central nervous system alterations in pain 
transmission and perception. It should emphasize that such central nervous 
system sensitization may arise in conjunction with a peripheral injury or 
 
142.  Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594 (4th Cir. 1996). 
143.  20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b), 404.1529(b) (2013). 
144.  See supra Part II.B, notes 86–92 (describing pain conditions). 
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disease or in the absence of a peripheral cause. This is consistent with the 
requirement that claims be supported by objective medical evidence, as 
numerous diagnostic tests and criteria exist for the medical diagnosis of 
chronic pain conditions. 
C. Revising Judge-Made Disability Standards in Light of New Pain 
Science 
To account for contemporary pain science, the ways judges adjudicate 
disability cases at the administrative and federal level similarly must evolve 
in concert with amendments to the regulations or independently. The 
regulations functionally may be changed through new judicial 
interpretations: Courts have the authority to recognize medical evidence 
that chronic pain can be an independent and distinct medical condition 
under the regulations as they currently exist. In this way, courts could 
simply incorporate evidence of pain chronification as a distinct 
neurological disorder into the existing disability framework that requires 
objective evidence of a medical condition that reasonably could lead to the 
degree of pain alleged. 
This avenue of constructive judicial amendment of the regulations is 
attractive because it does not require time-consuming administrative or 
legislative action. However, it ought to be a second-line alternative to 
revision of the regulations: It relies on diffuse bodies, ALJs and Article III 
judges, independently becoming aware of contemporary pain science and 
then crafting appropriate interpretive and evidentiary standards. Given the 
range of cases that judges must handle on a daily basis, it is not realistic to 
expect that more than a few of them will come to the scientific literature on 
their own and develop new standards. Moreover, district court judges, who 
are the more likely sources of innovation, are constrained by the standards 
already established by the appellate courts of their circuits. However, until 
SSA does act on this—and recall that SSA has been stalled since 1984—
individual judges may use their courtrooms as “laboratories of 
innovation.”145 
This short section first describes the different and conflicting judge-
made standards that circuits employ to interpret the SSDI regulations. 
These varying standards reflect a continuum from leniency to harshness, 
yet none reflects contemporary pain science. These varying standards also 
lead to radically different outcomes for similarly-situated claimants. After 
exploring the case law, this section suggests how courts could use pain 
science to revise their circuits’ interpretations of these regulations. 
 
145.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(popularizing the idea that the fifty states serve as “laboratories of democracy”). 
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1. Judge-Made Disability Law and Its Vagaries 
Even though ALJs and federal courts continue to engage faithfully in 
the regulations’ prescribed inquiries, they reach wildly divergent 
conclusions and have established inconsistent standards across federal 
circuits. Courts do share a basic consensus that pain must be severe to 
qualify as disabling; also, they agree that a person is not disabled merely 
because he or she cannot work pain-free. Beyond that foundation, courts 
across the United States apply three quite distinct pain evaluation 
standards. Although the courts that articulate these standards all cite the 
SSA regulation, nothing in that regulation sets forth any one of the 
elements of these requirements, much less all of them. These inconsistent 
and often vague standards leave adjudicators in the position of needing to 
fall back on their personal judgment about what pain looks like and whose 
pain they believe to be real. 
The most permissive standard provides that, to be disabled by pain, a 
claimant may be capable of gainful employment but that engaging in such 
employment would cause the claimant “great pain.”146 This is a minority 
standard, perhaps because it is in some tension with the SSD regulation 
providing that a claimant must be incapable of performing any “substantial 
gainful activity.”147 
Courts in a majority of jurisdictions apply an intermediate standard. 
This standard provides that a person’s pain must be so severe as to preclude 
gainful employment entirely, rendering work impossible.148 Under this 
standard, a person who would experience “great pain” from his or her work 
duties, but who was not entirely “preclude[d]” from performing them, 
would not qualify as disabled.149 
The most draconian pain standard is that developed by the Fifth 
Circuit. According to the case law of that circuit, to qualify as disabling, 
pain must not only preclude the claimant from any significant gainful 
employment; it also must be “constant, unremitting, and wholly 
unresponsive to therapeutic treatment.”150 This standard is not grounded in 
 
146.  See, e.g., Musto v. Halter, 135 F. Supp. 2d 220 (D. Mass. 2001); Williams v. Halter, 135 F. 
Supp. 2d 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Morin v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. 835 F. Supp. 1414 (D. N.H. 
1992). 
147.  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
148.  Courts in the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have used the 
impossibility standard, although not uniformly. See, e.g., House v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1993); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1992); 
Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1982); 
McCaskill ex rel. Harris v. Massanari, 152 F. Supp. 2d 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Rajt v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., 859 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 
149.  See Smith, 671 F.2d at 794 n.6; Hargis, 945 F.2d at 1489. 
150.  Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (establishing this standard in the Fifth 
Circuit) (emphasis added). 
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the language or substance of any disability statutes or regulations and is 
flatly contrary to the biology of chronic pain diseases. Chronic pain 
conditions remit and relapse. Many people with lifelong chronic pain 
conditions may have pain-free days. A person also may have pain every 
day, but the level of pain will vary from day to day, and often from 
morning to night.151 Indeed, a claim that one’s pain is absolutely invariable 
is more likely to be a marker of an inartfully fabricated claim than of an 
actual chronic pain condition. Moreover, fortunately, almost all chronic 
pain conditions can be at least partially treated, whether interventionally, 
pharmacologically, or behaviorally. Thus, this standard’s requirement that 
the condition be “wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” is as 
misguided as its insistence that the pain be constant in its level.152 
It is ironic that a judicial interpretation of the disability regulations, 
perhaps inspired by judges’ desire to reduce fraudulent claims, instead 
would articulate criteria more likely to reward the fraudster than the 
legitimate claimant, while enshrining the notion that claimants who do not 
meet this fictitious characterization of pain are frauds. This problem-
fraught standard might be of limited interest beyond the Fifth Circuit, 
except that it is spreading to federal courts in the Second, Third, Sixth, 
Seventh, and Eight Circuits, as well as to some ALJs.153 Because of its 
legal significance and the instructive depth of its manifold error, it is worth 
analyzing this standard and its history closely. 
The story of this standard dates back forty years to an opinion issued 
by an ALJ against claimant Chaney, holding he was not disabled because 
he did not have any “significant signs” consistent with chronic pain.154 
Chaney appealed and, in Chaney v. Califano, the Fifth Circuit affirmed.155 
In considering the ALJ’s finding that the claimant was not disabled, the 
court quoted the ALJ’s statement that: 
[P]ain is a subjective symptom that is not measurable, and it is 
recognized that there are many disorders in which . . . pain . . . is 
constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic 
measures. Generally, when an individual has suffered severe pain 
 
151.  Variability in pain level is highly characteristic of chronic pain conditions. Jennifer M. Foss 
et al., Dynamics of Pain: Fractal Dimension of Temporal Variability of Spontaneous Pain 
Differentiates Between Pain States, 95 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 730 (2006) (finding that fluctuations in 
pain level are characteristic neurobiological features of different chronic pain conditions); see also A. 
Vania Apkarian et al., Towards a Theory of Chronic Pain, 87 PROGRESS IN NEUROBIOLOGY 81 (2009) 
(describing neurological bases of pain variation in chronic pain conditions). 
152.  Hames, 707 F.2d at 166. 
153.  See generally Torres-Rosas v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Summers v. 
Colvin, No. 12CV22WMC, 2013 WL 6564451, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 13, 2013). 
154.  Chaney v. Califano, 588 F.2d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1979). 
155.  Id. 
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for a long time, there are observable signs. . . . In the instant case, 
there are no such significant signs or circumstances.156 
Highlighting this language from the ALJ’s opinion, the court in Chaney 
did not hold against the claimant because his pain was not “constant, 
unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic measures.”157 Nor did 
it state that only pain rising to that level constitutes statutory disability. 
Rather, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling against Chaney because 
he showed “no . . . significant signs” of suffering “severe pain for a long 
time.”158 The disability standard the ALJ actually employed, and that 
adopted by the circuit, was simply “severe pain for a long time,” not pain 
“constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic measures.” 
Effectively, the court held quite reasonably and unremarkably that a 
disability claim must be supported by evidence of the disability. 
Yet several years later, in Hames v. Heckler, a different panel of the 
circuit seized on that dicta from Chaney to hold that “[p]ain, in and of itself 
has been recognized as a disabling condition under the Act, but only where 
it is constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic 
treatment.”159 Heckler thus established in the Fifth Circuit a pain evaluation 
standard that is: (1) not present in the Act or any of the SSA’s regulations, 
(2) based on an apparent misreading of the circuit’s own prior case law, 
and (3) wholly inconsistent with the biology of chronic pain.160 
More than one-third of other circuit courts now employ the Fifth 
Circuit’s standard in some cases.161 Although none of these circuits has 
adopted the standard across the board, each employs it selectively. Courts’ 
selective use of this harsh and restrictive standard in some cases, but not in 
others, could result from any variety of factors from judges’ beliefs about 
the appropriate scope of social programs to variable research quality among 
law clerks. It may also reflect judges’ personal responses to a claimant, or 
type of pain syndrome, or a general skepticism toward pain claimants. 
2. Normative Dimensions of Judge-Made Standards 
The Seventh Circuit case Carradine v. Barnhart is just one case of 
many that illuminates the normative, rather than doctrinal or medical, 
values that play into mobilizing the “constant, unremitting, and totally 
 
156.  Id. (emphasis added). 
157.  See id. 
158.  See id. 
159.  Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
160.  See supra, Part II.A. 
161.  See Torres-Rosas v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Summers v. Colvin, No. 
12CV22WMC, 2013 WL 6564451 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 13, 2013). 
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unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.162 In Carradine, a panel of 
the Seventh Circuit reversed the finding of the ALJ that the claimant was 
not disabled due to chronic back pain.163 The plaintiff had endured several 
spinal surgeries, had a morphine pump implanted in her spine, and had 
severely curtailed her daily activities, but reported that she occasionally 
could take short walks or do some shopping.164 She did not have a history 
of mental illness.165 However, she lacked evidence of spinal abnormality or 
other visible causes of the alleged severe chronic pain.166 
Working within the constraints imposed by the regulations that a 
claimant cannot be disabled due to chronic pain without providing evidence 
of an objective medical condition that could produce the pain, Judge Posner 
penned a majority opinion finding Carradine disabled due to psychogenic 
pain, “somatoform pain disorder.”167 Carradine’s case presented no 
evidence of psychiatric disability independent of her persistent back 
pain.168 Yet, because Carradine did not have evidence of gross 
abnormalities or a disease independent of back pain itself, the court was 
constrained by the regulations either to find that she was not disabled or 
that Carradine’s disability originated in a psychiatric disorder. Crediting the 
record that Carradine had endured risky and painful surgeries to find relief 
from her pain and that she increasingly withdrew from pleasurable life 
activities, the majority was unwilling to find that she was not both 
experiencing pain and disabled by it.169 Accordingly, it crafted a remedy 
through relying on the psychiatric diagnosis available under the 
regulations. 
The majority holding engendered a blistering dissent, written almost 
entirely in italics with bold for emphasis, mobilizing the “constant, 
unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.170 
What makes the dissent remarkable beyond its typography is that it baldly 
asserts that chronic pain in the absence of evident peripheral injury simply 
does not exist—and that any claim to the contrary is pure fakery. The 
dissent berates the majority for failing to apply the “constant, unremitting, 
and wholly unresponsive to therapeutic treatment” standard.171 It notes that 
Carradine admitted that, on good days, she could take a short walk with her 
 
162.  Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004). 
163.  Id. at 756. 
164.  Id. at 755–56. 
165.  Id. at 761 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
166.  Id. at 760. 
167.  Id. at 756 (majority opinion). 
168.  Contra id. at 760 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
169.  Id. at 755–56 (majority opinion). 
170.  Id. at 762 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
171.  Id. 
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daughter; this, the dissent emphasizes, shows that the pain is not “constant 
and unremitting” and, therefore, not disabling.172 It goes on to assert that 
any pain without a clear peripheral cause, like Mrs. Carradine’s back pain, 
is either imagined or faked.173 
While the majority employs the psychiatric route as a way to 
compensate a claimant, the dissent argues the reverse: that people with 
psychogenic pain should not be rewarded.174 Such rewards, the dissent 
argues, just encourages what is, in effect, bad behavior—like giving a child 
an ice cream for a temper tantrum. In this manner, the dissent reinforces the 
stereotype that chronic pain patients are self-indulgent malingerers or 
hysterics and that the only remedy they deserve is the sharp admonition to 
snap out of it. 
The Carradine dissent is exemplary in tipping its normative hand: An 
adjudicator in the Fifth Circuit would be constrained to apply this standard, 
which is part of that jurisdiction’s precedent. Yet, in jurisdictions like the 
Seventh Circuit, where this standard is uncommon, an adjudicator must 
make an affirmative choice to adopt it as an expression of a negative 
perception of pain-based disability. Further, although the Carradine dissent 
stands out in its vitriol toward the claimant and chronic pain claimants 
generally, it is not substantively an aberration. Certain judges across the 
country selectively apply the “constant, unremitting, and wholly 
unresponsive” standard, and two lower courts have held consistently with 
this appellate dissent.175 
Ironically, the majority’s need to rely on the psychiatric diagnosis to 
support its disability finding feeds into the very stereotypes that animate the 
dissent. The majority, however, took this route because it was constrained 
by the regulations to find a psychiatric cause of disability. This means that 
the regulations themselves, in their attempt to provide a compensable 
category of disability for chronic pain without lesion through the 
somatoform diagnosis, undermine their purpose by misdescribing many 
chronic pain syndromes and by marginalizing chronic pain sufferers as 
mentally ill. Perhaps with greater medical knowledge and objective proof 
of the mechanisms that cause chronic pain, prevalent norms of skepticism 
and hostility toward chronic pain claimants can be supplanted. 
 
172.  Id. at 772 n.19. 
173.  Id. at 771. 
174.  See id. at 764. 
175.  See Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1126 (7th Cir. 2014); Ormon v. Astrue, 497 F. App’x. 
81 (1st Cir. 2012); Goodhart v. Astrue, No. 4:08CV82ASAPR, 2009 WL 1952019, at *5 (N.D. Ind. July 
6, 2009). 
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IV. NEUROIMAGING SHOULD CHANGE “SOFT” AND “HARD” EVIDENTIARY 
PRACTICES 
This Part explores neuroimaging evidence in light of the “hard” and 
“soft” practices of evidence law—that is, relative to the text of the rules as 
well as in light of the arguably more important norms and expectations that 
decision makers use to give content and meaning to those rules. These 
norms and expectations shape not only judges’ evidentiary calls but also 
their statutory interpretation practices and, thus, the creation of doctrine. 
This section will argue that neuroimaging currently ought to have some 
impact on both hard and soft practices, but far more on the latter. 
Evidence practice at trial consists of more than the application of the 
rules; it embraces the narrative character of the trial and extends to the 
evaluative process of judges and juries. These “soft” practices shape the 
trial process from the earliest stages of case building through to the 
appellate process, as decision makers at each stage evaluate evidentiary 
relevance, weight, and prejudice in light of their cultural and narrative 
expectations. Partly rooted in fear of fraud, partly in Freudian 
misconceptions of “hysteria,” soft practices of evidence relating to pain 
claimants may reflect entrenched biases. Judges and juries’ norms and 
expectations about chronic pain claimants and about the type of evidence 
required to make the claims credible should and likely will change in light 
of the new neuroscientific model of chronic pain. 
Neuroimaging evidence likely will find its way into the “hard” 
practices of evidence. In some cases, it likely will be appropriate to admit 
some neuroimaging studies of chronic pain into evidence under the federal 
and state evidence rules. Aggregate data about the average impact of pain 
conditions can inform doctrines relating to pain claims and expectations 
about the likely presentation and life course of a typical pain sufferer. 
Currently, however, neuroimaging should not be introduced to support or 
attack an individual’s claim relating to chronic pain.176 This is because of 
certain limitations of neuroimaging technologies and the medical 
variability of chronic pain conditions. 
This Part will look first at how “soft” evidentiary practices may be 
shifted by pain neuroimaging. It explores several evidentiary theories to 
explain how existing background expectations—whether called narratives, 
scripts, or another of the myriad terms scholars use for like phenomena—
about chronic pain distort the legal process. It offers specific suggestions 
for how new scientific models can change social and legal constructions in 
this arena, thus affecting evidence admissibility and weight and, ultimately, 
the outcomes of cases. It then turns to “hard” evidence practices, 
 
176.  See infra Part V.B. 
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considering how pain neuroimaging evidence should be evaluated under 
federal, state, and administrative evidence regimes. It concludes that pain 
neuroimaging and related research ought to be admissible in appropriate 
cases at the aggregate level but not to prove pain in any individual case. 
A. “Soft” Evidentiary Practices Shape the Litigation Process 
1. Narrative, Norms, and the Meaning of Proof: The Soft Side of 
Evidence Law 
The kind and degree of proof that satisfies a reasonable person relates 
to his or her understanding of the nature of the problem under 
consideration. Claims about expected or common events seem relatively 
plausible; these might be called “confirming” claims because they agree 
with the average decision maker’s lived experience and expectations. 
Claims about rare or unexpected events, conversely, invite relative 
skepticism; these might be called “confounding” claims because they 
confound the average decision maker’s experience, expectations, or beliefs. 
Confirming claims require less, and less specialized, evidence than 
confounding claims, which may require extraordinary proof or even strike 
the relevant decision maker as unprovable. 
Chronic pain presents confounding claims because most decision 
makers have little direct experience of such conditions; further, they are 
likely to hold common but mistaken beliefs about chronic pain’s causes, 
presentation, and persistence. Indeed, there is active disinformation about 
chronic pain; a dominant cultural narrative depicts chronic pain conditions 
as expressions of neurosis or hysteria, and legal doctrines, like those in 
disability law, directly incorporate this narrative into law. 
Whether a claim is confirming or confounding—whether it accords 
with background norms and expectations—has implications for the entire 
legal process and for evidence law in particular. Evidence scholarship must 
attend not only to the ways in which background expectations generally 
influence the fact-finding process but to instances where specific, 
erroneous expectations distort the legal process. These distortions can 
affect evidence admissibility determinations, the degree of weight that 
decision makers give to admitted evidence, the ways in which decision 
makers evaluate evidence against the relevant legal standard, and the 
conclusions that they reach in the matter.177 
 
177.  Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 315 (2013) (noting that 
background expectations or narrative assumptions present “procedural issues from end to end in the 
process of adjudication”). 
4 PUSTILNIK 1099-1158 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2015  2:42 PM 
1136 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 66:5:1099 
The role of cultural expectations and scripts, or “narratives,” is central 
to numerous theories of evidence law and, indeed, to theories of the 
construction of law itself. Preeminent legal scholars of the latter part of the 
twentieth century, like Robert Cover, put narrative at the center of the legal 
academy’s agenda with articles like Nomos and Narrative, in which he 
argued that legal actors create a shared normative world—a nomos—
through operative narratives and that all legal production and interpretation 
takes place within the nomos.178  Narrative studies within law advanced the 
project of excavating contestable narratives and then of crafting counter-
narratives and counter-histories to challenge them.179 More contemporary 
theories of judicial and juror decision making have moved away from the 
literary emphasis of narrative theory, drawing instead on fields ranging 
from logical philosophy to behavioral economics.180 These contemporary 
theories and older narrative-based theories share a central insight: Decision 
makers impose order on the teeming facts of the world by screening in 
evidence that is confirming and screening out evidence that is confounding, 
consistently preferring the interpretation that conforms to their 
expectations. 
2. Confounding Claims and the Quantum of Proof Needed to “Prove” 
Degrees of doubt often inversely shadow degrees of understanding and 
acceptance. Thresholds of proof track cultural narratives and evolve as 
those narratives evolve. Up through the mid-twentieth century, when it was 
commonly believed that women lied about consensual sex to protect their 
reputations for chastity or fabricated a rape claim entirely, more evidence 
of rape was necessary to render credible a complainant’s allegation.181 
Statutes requiring independent corroboration of the rape victim’s 
complaint, which have their roots in biblical law, were in force in 
jurisdictions in the United States through the 1970s.182 Other formal 
 
178.  Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, 
Nomos]; see also Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 
179, 180 (1985) [hereinafter Cover, Folktales]. 
179.  Narrative studies are not a single movement but a methodology engaged in by legal scholars 
working in various domains, particularly in critical race studies and in law and literature. For 
foundational works emphasizing the role of narrative in constructing law’s nomos, see Cover, Nomos, 
supra note 178; Cover, Folktales, supra note 176; LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940). 
180.  See infra notes 187–202 (discussing work by Pardo, Allen, Kahneman, Slovic, Tversky, and 
others). 
181.  Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4–9 (1977). 
182.  See Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 
1367–68 (1972); Irving Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prosecutions for Sex Offenses 
in New York, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 264–67 (1971); see also Berger, supra note 181, at 9 
(describing the history of the corroboration statutes). 
4 PUSTILNIK 1099-1158 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2015  2:42 PM 
2015] Imaging Brains, Changing Minds 1137 
sources of evidence practice, like pattern jury instructions, also embodied 
the doubt and skepticism facing rape complainants. Even into the 1980s, 
pattern jury instructions stated that failure to promptly report a claim of 
rape supported an inference of fabrication.183 Another jury instruction, 
derived from Lord Hale, cautioned jurors that a rape accusation ‘“is one 
which is easily made. . . . [T]he law requires that you examine the 
testimony of the [alleged victim] with caution.”184 
Evidence law and practice in this area emerged from and reinforced 
norms of suspicion about women’s veracity, especially as to matters of 
sex.185 They incorporated, too, a concern about fraud: Fraudulent claims are 
easy to make and hard to disprove. In these areas, subsequent dialogue 
between research data and normative change has altered the landscape of 
proof—not so much through changes in law itself as through changes in the 
default expectations of the participants in the system.186 
Chronic pain is not equivalent to crimes of sexual assault, and chronic 
pain claimants are not viewed in a manner directly equivalent to rape 
victims. But the former is an illustrative parallel to the latter for several 
reasons. Chronic pain affects both men and women but affects women 
disproportionately; background concerns about the unreliable female 
narrator thus affect pain claimants, too.187 Chronic pain claims, like claims 
of sexual victimization, have long invited doubt and even presumptions of 
fabrication. And the hysterical or secondary gain theories of chronic pain 
share an origin with some of the psychoanalytic theories suggesting that 
women fantasize sexual violence, specifically because they enjoy the status 
of victimhood or the subjective feeling of victimization itself.188 Further, 
and perhaps most importantly, the history of change in evidence law related 
 
183.  Berger, supra note 181, at 10 n.72; see also Dawn M. DuBois, A Matter of Time: Evidence 
of a Victim’s Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1087 (1988) (describing the 
continued vitality of this rule in New York and other jurisdictions through the late 1980s). 
184.  Berger, supra note 181, at 10 (citing as an example a then-common jury instruction, 
California Jury Instructions, Crim. (CALJIC) No. 10.22 (3d ed. 1970)). 
185.  Id. at 11 (arguing that these features of rape evidence law “stem[] mainly from a deep 
distrust of the female accuser. Indeed, the quoted jury instructions all but make the point explicit.”). 
186.  This is not to suggest that the reform project in these areas is complete. Despite formal 
changes, scholars argue that the legal process continues to be shaped by these troublingly persistent 
norms. Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased 
Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 778 (2001). 
187.  See Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 287 (2005); 
Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, The Girl Who Cried Pain: A Bias Against Women in the 
Treatment of Pain, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 13 passim (2001). 
188.  See CHARLOTTE KRAUSE PROZAN, FEMINIST PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 160–62 
(1992) (describing work of Helene Deutsch and Marie Bonaparte in developing early psychoanalytic 
theory of the female character as masochistic and thus prone to seeking and enjoying suffering). Cf. 
PAULA J. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF WOMEN’S MASOCHISM (1985) (challenging characterization of the 
female character as masochistic). 
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to rape shows how evidence incorporates and reinforces background 
expectations or schemas about particular kinds of claimants. 
Reliance on narratives and background expectations may conflict with 
“the truth-seeking goals of trial” and “risk distortions in fact-finding.”189 
Several scholars have pointed to these risks and flaws in decision making 
as opportunities “to increase analytic processing” by nudging trials away 
from the narrative model.190 It is likely that aspects of narrative are 
inescapable in the legal process; indeed, narrative may be essential to all 
legal endeavors, given that the structures and forms of the legal systems 
have emerged from human cognition. The purpose here would not be to 
remove narrative itself, but to change the narrative expectations and 
content. 
Contemporary models offer a range of alternative accounts of how 
judges and jurors weigh diverse facts to reach a verdict or judgment. Like 
the narrative model, these models also rely heavily on decision makers’ 
background assumptions about the world—that is, their norms and 
expectations. Michael Pardo and Ronald Allen have advanced a decision-
making model that they call the “explanation-based model.”191 In their 
account, jurors engage in a technique of “inference to the best explanation,” 
(known formally in logical philosophy as “abductive reasoning”), to arrive 
at a conclusion that reconciles the facts of the case in a way that is “simple” 
and “coherent.”192 By “coherent,” Pardo and Allen mean a story that “better 
accords with background beliefs . . . .”193 As in the narrative model, the 
abductive or explanation-based model describes and predicts that decision 
makers discount or outright reject facts that do not comport with their 
background beliefs. Thus, background beliefs do a large share of the work 
in both explaining how decision makers weigh evidence and in constituting 
what counts as legal proof. 
Evidence scholarship that draws on behavioral economics also supports 
the role of background expectations or culturally received stories. Several 
of the key heuristics and biases identified by behavioral economics support 
the conclusion that decision makers prefer confirming stories and resist 
confounding stories. Following the influential work of Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman, prominent scholars like Dan Simon have explored the 
 
189.  Griffin, supra note 177, at 285. 
190.  Id.; Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW 
& PHIL. 223, 225 n.3 (2008). 
191.  Pardo & Allen, supra note 190, at 225. 
192.  Id. at 226. 
193.  Id. at 230; see also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision 
Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 521 (1991). 
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implications of a “two system” method of decision making.194 The “two 
system” hypothesis posits that people engage functionally (albeit not 
neurologically) distinct cognitive systems for making different kinds of 
decisions.195 People mobilize System 1 for rapid, intuitive decision making; 
they mobilize a functionally distinct System 2 for more considered or 
“rational” decisions. 
Decisions achieved via one system are not necessarily better than those 
achieved by the other; both forms of decision making have strengths and 
weaknesses. However, empirical research demonstrates that rapid System 1 
decisions are highly inaccurate when subjects rely on intuition about 
subjects in which they do not have deep experience.196 This is troubling 
because most daily decision making could be described as System 1; yet, 
most of the decisions one must reach in a legal context are outside of the 
ordinary experience of decision makers. Where intuitive decision making is 
not grounded in experience or expertise, but instead informed by received 
cultural stories and “common sense,” it tends to recapitulate 
misinformation and stereotype. Such research suggests, depressingly, most 
people’s intuitions are wrong most of the time—even though, to the 
decision maker, the intuitive decision feels so right.197 
Mobilizing the language of narrative theory and of behavioral 
economics, Professor Griffin argues that behavioral economics research 
confirms the ways in which narrative has a significant effect on fact 
finding.198 Narrative expectations, she argues, “provide[] a deep structure 
inside the courtroom just as [they do] outside of it . . . .”199 This is because 
judges and jurors exhibit “confirmation bias”—that is, the tendency to 
“interpret evidence in a fashion that supports existing preferences, beliefs, 
expectations, and theories.”200 Further, in “moments of uncertainty,” judges 
and jurors (like all people faced with complex or uncertain decisions) 
display “belief perseverance,” which makes them “more likely to doubt 
evidence that conflicts with a preexisting paradigm and to interpret what is 
 
194.  Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 184 
(2011). 
195.  Id. at 184–85. 
196.  And even some kinds of expert intuition can be highly inaccurate. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 234–44 (2011) (discussing when expert opinions are, and are not, reliable). 
197.  Id. 
198.  Griffin, supra note 177, at 291. 
199.  Id. at 293. 
200.  Id. at 313 (citing D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer 
Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7, 15 
(2002)). For the foundational work in behavioral economics, including work on confirmation bias, see 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos 
Tversky eds., 1982). 
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ambiguous as consistent with that belief.”201 Yet, such decision makers feel 
that they have come to accurate, factual decisions, rejecting that “implicit 
emotional response[s]” could affect them as “source[s] of prejudice.”202 
These accounts—narrative, abductive, and behavioral economic—
about how cognitive processes shape evidence law and trial process share a 
fundamental premise.203 Background expectations about the nature of the 
world and people’s behavior shape what decision makers credit as proof, 
how they weigh such proof, and the conclusions that they draw from such 
proof. These theories are all formalized ways of stating that people (a) 
reject as implausible that which conflicts with what they believe they know 
and (b) seek to construct accounts from evidence that comport with their 
beliefs “about what typically happens in the world.”204 And rightly so; it 
would be impossible to navigate the world without relying on background 
expectations. Yet, unstated background expectations can also lead to 
systematic prejudices and errors, as the next section will explore. 
B. “Soft” Practices of Evidence Law Encode Bias 
While reliance on story and archetype are not inherently objectionable 
and may be unavoidable, it is important to attend to where narrative 
operates and to its particular content. “[A]djudication produces 
institutionalized meaning from evidence”; thus it is important to examine 
“constructs and procedures” that facilitate or inhibit the accuracy of the 
legal process.205 Indeed, evidence law and practice is rife with examples of 
the ways in which background expectations distort the fact-finding process 
and lead decision makers astray. Just a few include the common bias in 
favor of the reliability of—and, hence, both admissibility and weight 
accorded to—eyewitness identifications,206 the correlation between a 
 
201.  Griffin, supra note 177, at 312–13 n. 178 (citing Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation 
and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979) (“[J]udgments about the validity, reliability, 
relevance, and sometimes even the meaning of proffered evidence are biased by the apparent 
consistency of that evidence with the perceiver’s theories and expectations.”)). 
202.  Griffin, supra note 177, at 314. 
203.  See id. at 294 (noting that these several “theories contemplate that jurors will draw upon 
their own backgrounds to construct and evaluate explanations for the evidence”). 
204.  Pennington & Hastie, supra note 193, at 522, 589. 
205.  Griffin, supra note 177, at 290. 
206.  See Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing 
Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 115, 
119–20 (2006); see also, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing district 
court’s exclusion of expert testimony on reliability of eyewitness identification); United States v. 
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability to be 
admissible). 
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witness’s confidence in a memory and the accuracy of that memory,207 and 
the disproportionate credibility decision makers assign to forensic sciences 
(the so-called “CSI effect”).208 
The chronic pain claimant currently faces high degrees of skepticism—
she is “the girl who cried pain.”209 But this, too, is likely to change as 
greater understanding of the facts of chronic pain diseases spread through 
legal and general culture. Judicial and continuing legal education, and the 
use of expert witnesses to educate juries (and judges) within the courtroom, 
can change the normative and factual expectations of the participants 
within these systems. 
Adjudicators’ skepticism of, or hostility toward, chronic pain claimants 
may arise in some part from a pre-scientific vision of pain as emotional 
dysfunction, which emerged from a historical literature that few readers 
today would recognize as medical or scientific: the “anecdata” of the 
psychoanalytic case history, like the Anna O. case discussed in Part I, 
which are an often highly unreliable narrative form. These tropes continue 
to be peddled today; even a cursory Amazon.com search reveals dozens of 
popular books extoling the premise that a person who adjusts her attitude 
and acknowledges her emotions will free herself of persistent chronic 
pain—in as little as one day.210 Similarly, there is an industry of defense 
experts that supports this relationship.211 
Contemporary pain researchers acknowledge the essential 
interrelationship of one’s emotional life and the life of the body, but not in 
this magical, mind-over-matter manner.212 Along with rejecting hysteria as 
the etiology of chronic pain, mainstream pain scientists similarly make 
short shrift of previously popular ideas like “secondary gain,” the 
increasingly-discredited notion that people with long-term, unexplained 
chronic pain unconsciously exaggerate or manufacture their pain because 
 
207.  Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the 
Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 739, 745 (2007); 35 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts 
§ 46 (“[I]n study after study, it has been demonstrated that one’s confidence in the accuracy [of] the 
recollection of an event is not a good predictor of the actual accuracy of the recall.”); United States v. 
Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1400 (3d Cir. 1991) (approving testimony of the low correlation between 
confidence and accuracy “[t]o rebut the natural assumption that such a strong expression of confidence 
indicates an unusually reliable identification”). 
208.  See Evan W. Durnal, Crime Scene Investigation (As Seen on TV), FORENSIC SCI. INT’L, 
June 15, 2010, at 1. 
209.  See Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 187. 
210.  John E. Sarno publishes bestsellers promising that people can be free of chronic pain by 
letting go of perfectionism and repressed anger. See, e.g., JOHN E. SARNO, HEALING BACK PAIN: THE 
MIND-BODY CONNECTION (2010); JOHN E. SARNO, MIND OVER BACK PAIN (1999). 
211.  See Finch, supra note 187, at 301 n.115 and accompanying text (collecting cases, with 
examples). 
212.  See infra notes 214–217 and accompanying text. 
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they enjoy the status, attention, or other intangible benefits that come to 
them by virtue of being disabled.213 
Emotion and pain are related in important ways. First and foremost, 
pain creates a negative emotional experience (if we perceived it as a 
positive experience, it would be pleasure).214 Chronic pain has emotional 
consequences as sufferers miss out on living the lives they had or wish they 
could have; social isolation, loss of work, loss of income, and, of course, 
constant suffering, lead to understandable emotional distress.215 Chronic 
pain compromises the brain’s cognitive and affective functioning, creating 
cognitive and emotional difficulties as a side effect of the pain syndrome.216 
Depressed mood and stress can augment the experience of pain, while 
pleasurable and distracting activities, and strong social support, can 
moderate pain.217 
Yet, the one way in which emotion and chronic pain most frequently 
are not related is the one embedded in our legal system: that chronic pain is 
predominantly a form of hysteria in which emotionally-disturbed people 
unconsciously generate the experience of pain. The next section proposes 
ways in which this new understanding of chronic pain, and of the 
relationship between chronic pain and emotion, should reform evidentiary 
doctrines and practices related to chronic pain. 
 
213.  David Servan-Schreiber et al., Somatizing Patients: Part I. Practical Diagnosis, 61 AM. 
FAM. PHYSICIAN 1073, 1075 (2000) (“[T]he somatizing patient seems to seek the sick role, which 
affords relief from stressful or impossible interpersonal expectations . . . and, in most societies, provides 
attention, caring and sometimes even monetary reward . . . .”). See Rollin M. Gallagher, Secondary 
Gain in Pain Medicine: Let Us Stick with Biobehavioral Data, 3 AM. PAIN SOC’Y J. 274, 274 (1994). 
See generally David A. Fishbain, Secondary Gain Concept: Definition Problems and Its Abuse in 
Medical Practice, 3 AM. PAIN SOC’Y J. 264 (1994). 
214.  Ronald Melzack and P.D. Wall formalized the relationship between physical and affective 
in the experience of pain in their landmark 1965 paper The Gate Control Theory of Pain. See Ronald 
Melzack & P.D. Wall, The Gate Control Theory of Pain: A Re-Examination and Re-Statement, 101 
BRAIN 1 (1978) (updating and augmenting the 1965 paper that proposed the original model). Since 
1979, the standard medical definition of pain has described pain’s dual composition as “[a]n unpleasant 
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in 
terms of such damage.” INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF PAIN, PAIN TERM: A 
CURRENT LIST WITH DEFINITIONS AND NOTES ON USAGE (2011), available at http://iasp.files.cms-
plus.com/Content/ContentFolders/Publications2/ClassificationofChronicPain/Part_III-PainTerms.pdf 
(defining “pain”). 
215.  David A. Fishbain et al., Chronic Pain-Associated Depression: Antecedent or Consequence 
of Chronic Pain? A Review, 13 CLINICAL J. OF PAIN 116, 137 (1997) (meta-analysis of research 
assessing the relationship of chronic pain and depression; concluding that most chronic pain patients 
develop depression subsequent to and resulting from chronic pain). 
216.  A. Vania Apkarian et al., Chronic Pain Patients Are Impaired on an Emotional Decision-
Making Task, 108 PAIN 129, 129, 136 (2004) (finding “that chronic pain is associated with a specific 
cognitive deficit, which may impact everyday behavior especially in . . . emotionally laden[] 
situations”; hypothesizing that pain interferes with affective processing, leading to reduced affective 
decision-making performance). 
217.  Katja Wiech & Irene Tracey, The Influence of Negative Emotions on Pain: Behavioral 
Effects and Neural Mechanisms, 47 NEUROIMAGE 987 (2009) (surveying literature on point). 
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C. New “Soft” Evidentiary Norms for Adjudicators and Fact Finders 
A new set of norms about chronic pain ought to be incorporated into 
the legal system to unseat the pejorative and medically outmoded premises 
built into the SSDI regime, judicial interpretations of SSDI regulations, and 
decisions makers’ presumptions in non-SSDI cases. This section presents a 
new, suggested set of default norms. 
From a rebuttable presumption of hysteria or fraud to a neutral 
presumption. The first and most important normative shift around chronic 
pain starts with baseline presumptions. Although not universal, a common 
presumption is that the chronic pain claimant is mentally ill or is 
fabricating the claim. In place of this pejorative norm, with its lingering 
Freudianism, there ought to be a neutral presumption that the pain claimant, 
like any other disability or tort claimant, may or may not be credible and 
needs to prove her case. 
Chronic pain is not a form of mental illness. Chronic pain is not a 
mental illness and typically does not result from mental illness. Depressive 
illness and cognitive impairment more often follow the development of a 
chronic pain condition than precede it. In a subset of chronic pain patients, 
a history of trauma may have created a biological predisposition to develop 
chronic pain in response to an injury. Whether a claimant had this latent 
predisposition does not make the condition the claimant’s fault, nor does it 
mean that he or she can fix the subsequently-developed pain condition 
through addressing the emotional issue. Rather, it makes these individuals 
the classic vulnerable victims or “glass jaw” plaintiffs. 
Psychogenic pain conditions do occur. However, as the DSM-IV 
cautions, these conditions are rare and unusual. According to the DSM-IV, 
psychiatrists (and others) should be reluctant to diagnose psychogenic pain 
or somatoform disorder in the absence of clear indicators that the chronic 
pain condition does not result primarily from a non-psychiatric medical 
condition.218 
Chronic pain cannot be braved away with a positive attitude. 
Culturally-received stories of people being miraculously cured of their 
chronic pain through identifying and resolving an emotional conflict are 
just that—stories. They may in some cases be true stories, just as some 
religious believers in fact experience remission of disease symptoms 
through faith healing. Yet, such anecdotes do not prove that chronic pain 
can be talked away through psychotherapy or braved away through positive 
thinking any more than faith healing experiences suggest that most 
hospitals should be converted into churches. 
 
218.  TASK FORCE ON DSM-IV, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-IV-TR 490, 503 (4th ed. rev. 2000). 
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Chronic pain fluctuates, and chronic pain conditions can be relapsing-
remitting. People with chronic pain conditions have good days and bad 
days. These good days and bad days may relate to the lifecourse of the 
disease or to patient-specific or external factors, including degree of social 
support, physical therapy, medical treatment, financial and other pressures, 
and overall mood.219 In an otherwise medically well-substantiated case, 
decision makers should understand that the presence of good days does not 
mean the person is faking it on the bad days, nor should they see the 
positive impact of social and emotional support as a sign that the pain 
condition is emotional in origin. This understanding of chronic pain as 
inherently variable, relapsing/remitting, and affected by life circumstances, 
is contrary to the Fifth Circuit standard that, to be legally disabling, chronic 
pain must be “constant, unremitting, and wholly unresponsive to 
therapeutic treatment.”220 
Paternalism toward chronic pain patients is inappropriate and anti-
therapeutic. Decision makers adjudicating chronic pain claims at times 
adopt a questionable paternalism toward chronic pain claimants. One such 
notion is that attention and compensation perpetuate the claimant’s pain by 
“rewarding” the pain behavior. This belief leads to the conclusion that 
chronic pain claimants need to be denied compensation as a kind of “tough 
love” that will help them move on with their lives. There are three 
problems with this approach, one of which is factual and two of which are 
legal. The factual issue is that there is no evidence that the reward theory is 
true, and a lot of evidence that it is not.221 The first legal issue is that this 
approach violates horizontal equity: As to no other condition or category of 
claimants do decision makers argue that they ought to withhold otherwise 
merited compensation for the good of the claimant. The second legal-
theoretical problem with the reward theory relates to the institutional role 
of the decision maker. Judges have an important and appropriate role in 
interpreting law and regulations and in developing the common law. Doing 
so is not judicial activism, it is judicial performance. However, if a law or 
regulation provides that a disability is compensable, or tort law provides 
that a negligently caused impairment is compensable, then it is 
inappropriate activism for the judge to treat differently one category of 
disabilities or impairments based on beliefs about what would be good for 
the plaintiff/claimant. 
 
219.  Decision makers should understand that, although low mood can exacerbate pain, depressed 
mood itself generally does not cause chronic pain. See supra notes 214–217. 
220.  See supra Section III.C.1. 
221.  Nicholas Shenker, et al., Developing Concepts in Allodynic Pain, 8 CLIN. MED. 79, 79 
(2008) (dismissing secondary gain as medically unsubstantiated, blaming “legal profession” for 
perpetuating the concept). 
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V. CHRONIC PAIN NEUROIMAGING AND “HARD” EVIDENCE PRACTICES: 
THE CASE FOR LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY OF PAIN NEUROIMAGING 
Moving on from “soft” evidentiary considerations involving norms and 
narratives, this Part considers “hard” or black letter legal questions about 
the admissibility of expert evidence concerning chronic pain that emerges 
from pain neuroimaging studies. Neuroimaging, and testimony about such 
neuroimaging, concerning the ways chronic pain changes the brain ought to 
be admissible in suitable cases. Such evidence will not be relevant in every 
case involving a chronic pain claim. The best and most valid uses of such 
evidence will be to inform the fact finders’ and adjudicators’ understanding 
of what chronic pain is and to assist them in their evaluation of the rest of 
the evidence. Aggregate neuroimaging evidence showing how chronic pain 
changes the brain can educate the fact finder, first, about the reality of 
chronic pain diseases and, second, about how a particular chronic pain 
condition may on average affect sufferers’ brains and behaviors. It should 
not, however, be admitted to prove or disprove the presence of chronic pain 
in any individual claimant, as neuroimaging techniques are not sufficiently 
reliable at the individual level. 
Claims involving chronic pain may arise in federal, state, or 
administrative proceedings. This Part opens by briefly describing the 
federal, state, and Social Security administrative (“SSA”) standards for 
admitting expert medical and scientific evidence. These evidentiary 
regimes differ in important ways; they vary as to whether they prescribe 
specific tests for the qualifications of experts and expert evidence, and if 
so, as to the tests they prescribe. Yet the touchstone of admissibility across 
all of them is the same: whether the evidence is relevant and whether its 
relevance outweighs its potential to mislead or confuse the finder of fact. 
Thus, while recognizing the ways in which these evidentiary regimes vary, 
this Part offers largely consistent proposals for what types of pain 
neuroimaging evidence should, and should not, be admitted in federal, 
state, or SSA proceedings. 
A. Federal, State, and Administrative Admissibility Standards 
Federal, state, and SSA rules for the admissibility of expert scientific 
and medical evidence are designed to admit evidence that is relevant and 
helpful to the fact finder, and to exclude evidence that is not. These three 
regimes may be characterized as falling on a continuum, on which the SSA 
is the most liberal in admitting medical and scientific evidence, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence occupy a middle ground, and state evidence laws 
modeled on the Frye standard are the most restrictive. Despite their 
differences, however, relevant neuroimaging evidence offered to educate 
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the finder of fact about various pain conditions ought to satisfy each of 
these admissibility standards. This short section describes standards for 
expert evidence under each of these regimes and then applies these 
standards to evaluate the admissibility of this type of evidence. 
1. Federal Rules of Evidence 
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 702 govern the admissibility of 
expert evidence, including scientific and medical evidence.222 Rule 401 
provides that all relevant evidence is admissible, unless it is subject to some 
special exclusion; evidence is not admissible if it is not relevant.223 Once a 
court has determined that proffered expert evidence is relevant, it evaluates 
its admissibility under Rule 702, which governs expert evidence. The 
touchstone of admissibility under Rule 702 is whether the expert evidence 
will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue.”224 If a matter is within the experience and understanding of 
jurors, expert evidence on that matter is not admissible because of the 
concern that the expert will usurp the function of the jury. If a matter is 
outside of the understanding and experience of the typical juror, and it is 
material to the determination of some aspect of the case, a court may admit 
expert testimony to enable jurors to come to an informed conclusion about 
the matter.225 
After a court determines that expert evidence may aid the jury, the 
burden is on the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate that it satisfies 
threshold requirements set forth in Rule 702. Rule 702, which incorporates 
standards that the Supreme Court developed in Daubert v. Merrill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,226 requires that the expert testimony be “based on 
sufficient facts or data” and that it be “the product of reliable principles and 
methods.”227 Finally, the expert must have “applied the principles and 
methods [reliably] to the facts of the case.”228 Even evidence based on 
reliable principles and methods, though, must be excluded if “there is 
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered.”229 
 
222.  FED. R. EVID. 401, 702. 
223.  FED. R. EVID. 401. 
224.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
225.  FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (expert witnesses may testify as to matters of opinion if the opinion 
“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”). 
226.  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
227.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
228.  Id. 
229.  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[C]onclusions and methodology are 
not entirely distinct from one another. . . . A court may conclude that there is simply too great an 
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”). 
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The precise meaning of these requirements has given rise to a large 
body of literature and some significant dispute.230 The rule itself offers no 
guidance on what makes a principle or method “reliable,” or on what 
makes facts and data “sufficient.” Further, the rule is entirely silent on how 
a court ought to determine whether the principles and methods—even if 
reliable and sufficient—are adequately related to the expert’s conclusion. 
Daubert lists a few illustrative factors that a trial judge may consider to 
assess the reliability and sufficiency of expert evidence. These include 
whether the “the theory or technique . . . has been subjected to peer 
review,” whether it has a “known or potential error rate,” and “whether it 
has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific 
community.”231 
As Professor Eleanor Swift has noted, this standard grants wide latitude 
to trial judges as gatekeepers of scientific evidence.232 Scholars and judges 
agree that it tends toward liberal admissibility: Many judges engage in 
limited independent evaluation of medical, scientific, or other expert 
evidence and instead trust the adversary process to test evidence through a 
“battle of [the] experts.”233 
2. State Rules of Evidence 
State evidence codes, like the Federal Rules of Evidence, also 
condition the admissibility of any evidence on its relevance: Relevant 
evidence is presumptively admissible while irrelevant evidence is not.234 
However, many states apply a standard to expert evidence that is more 
restrictive than the federal standard, excluding otherwise-relevant evidence 
if it has not gained “general acceptance” within the relevant expert 
community.235 This general acceptance standard, first articulated in Frye v. 
 
230.  Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries of 
Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827 (2008); Thomas A. Mauet, The New World of Experts in 
Federal and State Courts, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 223 (2001). 
231.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580. 
232.  Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 2437 (2000). 
233.  Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 
1121, 1125–26 (2001) (surveying scholarly and judicial opinion). 
234.  State evidence codes have provisions that are analogous or identical to Rule 401. Compare 
FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”), 
with CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 2014) (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence 
relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or 
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”), and TEX. R. 
EVID. 401 (West 2014) (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.”). 
235.  Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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United States nearly a century ago,236 remains in use to some degree in 
many states.237 Different states, however, apply Frye somewhat differently: 
Some adhere to Frye strictly, while others merely consider general 
acceptance as one factor in the admissibility determination. In many states 
that ostensibly follow Frye, judges engage in a broader reliability inquiry 
similar to the inquiry under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.238 
To determine whether expert evidence has gained general acceptance 
under Frye or a Frye-like test, courts principally look at whether the 
evidence itself, or the techniques and methods from which it is derived, 
have achieved particular status in the relevant expert community.239 Courts 
may look at whether the evidence is considered uncontroversial within the 
research field, or whether the evidence or methods on which it is based 
appear in textbooks and major treatises. This inquiry is significantly more 
conservative than under the federal rule, because scientific and medical 
consensus can take decades to achieve, if consensus emerges at all. 
Additionally, the Frye test provides a different role for the judge: Under the 
federal rule, the judge must determine the reliability of expert evidence; 
under Frye, the judge must delegate that determination to experts in the 
field by establishing whether they would find the evidence acceptable. 
3. SSA Administrative Proceedings 
In administrative proceedings, the administrative law judge (ALJ) is 
both trier of law and finder of fact, much like a state or federal judge in a 
bench trial.240 All agency proceedings are governed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).241 The APA authorizes agencies to take evidence in 
their proceedings; yet, it does not provide rules of evidence. Instead, 
agencies promulgate their own evidentiary rules and practices. This short 
section focuses exclusively on the evidentiary rules and procedures of the 
 
236.  Id. 
237.  States still following Frye include: California, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1994); In 
re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1188 (Ill. 2004); State v. Shively, 999 P.2d 952, 955 
(Kan. 2000); Burral v. Maryland, 724 A.2d 65, 70 (Md.1999); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 
803 (Minn. 2000); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621 (N.J. 1997); People v. Angelo, 666 N.E.2d 1333, 
1335 (N.Y. 1996); Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 1999); Washington v. Copeland, 
922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996). 
238.  Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific 
Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 478–79 (2005) (“[I]n criminal cases, the adoption of the 
Daubert test, whether in state or federal court, had no statistically significant effect on admission 
rates.”). 
239.  Id. at 476. 
240.  20 C.F.R. § 405.1 (2013) states that “[a]ll adjudicators . . . have the authority to find facts 
and, if appropriate, to conduct a fair and impartial hearing in accordance with section 205(b) of the 
Act.” 
241.  5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012). 
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Social Security Administration because of that agency’s role in 
adjudicating disability claims. 
In SSA disability determinations, ALJs’ evidentiary determinations are 
governed by a flexible, general standard rather than by a code equivalent to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.242 Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.350 states that the 
claimant has “[t]he right to appear and present evidence”243 and that “[t]he 
administrative law judge may receive any evidence at the hearing that he or 
she believes relates to your claim.”244 Section 405.331 of the same title 
instructs the claimant to “submit with your request for hearing any 
evidence that you have available to you.”245 Evidence “must be complete 
and detailed enough” for an adjudicator to determine the existence of the 
disability and its duration and severity.246 Additionally, section 405.1(c)(2) 
states that the SSA “also will consider any relevant information that we 
have in our records.”247 
Beyond these very general evidentiary provisions set forth in the 
federal regulations, the SSA has promulgated guidance for claimants in its 
Bluebook. The Bluebook instructs claimants that a disability claim requires 
medical evidence from treating physicians,248 but that the SSA also accepts 
and reviews medical evidence from other ‘“acceptable medical 
sources.’”249 An “acceptable medical source” includes a “nonexamining 
source,” meaning a “physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical 
source who has not examined you but provides a medical or other opinion 
in your case.”250 The Bluebook indicates in broad terms the kinds of expert 
evidence that a claimant may submit. Yet, unlike the federal and state rules, 
it does not establish any criteria relating to the quality of the expert 
evidence. These provisions constitute the entirety of the SSA regulations 
concerning the admissibility of evidence in disability proceedings, a stark 
contrast to the detailed federal and state rules of evidence and all their 
resulting interpretive case law. 
 
242.  Title 20 C.F.R. § 405.1 (2013) sets forth the SSA’s “procedures for adjudicating the 
disability portion of initial claims for entitlement to benefits based on disability under title II of the 
Social Security Act. . . .” 
243.  § 405.350(a). 
244.  § 405.350(b). 
245.  § 405.331(a). 
246.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d) (OASDI); 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(e) (SSI). 
247.  20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(2). 
248.  Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: Part II - Evidentiary Requirements, SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/evidentiary.htm 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
249.  Id. 
250.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. 
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4. Common Features of These Regimes: Relevance and Reliability 
Despite the formal differences between these regimes,251 evidence 
determinations under all of these regimes share a common foundation: 
They are grounded in relevance, and to varying extents, they require 
reliability and helpfulness to the finder of fact.252 Because of these 
similarities, the admissibility of neuroimaging evidence ought to be 
substantially similar in federal, state, and administrative proceedings. 
All of these regimes depart from the presumption that all relevant 
evidence is admissible. Federal and state practice, although balanced in 
favor of the admissibility of all relevant evidence under Rule 401, do 
permit some relevant evidence to be excluded: Relevant evidence may be 
excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, or has the tendency to 
mislead or confuse the jury.253 Relevant evidence also may be excluded if it 
constitutes impermissible hearsay or if it violates constitutional 
requirements, like the right of confrontation.254 The SSA regime admits 
relevant evidence more liberally, as it has no special exclusions equivalent 
to the federal and state exclusionary rules.255 Finally, the regulations 
impose an affirmative obligation on the SSA to search its own records for 
any relevant evidence and to bring such evidence forward in a 
proceeding.256 
Federal and state evidence law specifies criteria designed to assist the 
judge in determining whether proffered expert evidence is reliable. The 
SSA regime appears to differ from the federal and state rules in that it does 
not set forth criteria for evaluating the reliability of expert evidence. Yet it, 
too, implicitly contains a reliability requirement: Evidence that is not at 
reliable cannot be relevant, since that which is false, misleading, or of 
indeterminate reliability cannot aid the search for truth. 
Beyond relevance and reliability, to the extent that those criteria differ, 
federal and state rules also limit expert evidence to that which is “help[ful] 
[to] the trier of fact” by informing them on subjects outside of jurors’ 
ordinary competence.257 As with reliability, the SSA standard appears to be 
 
251.  The evidentiary rules are relatively informal because the administrative proceeding is 
defined as “non-adversarial.” 20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(1). 
252.  See William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y.L 
SCH. L. REV. 829, 831 (2005). 
253.  FED. R. EVID. 403; see also, e.g., MD. R. 5-403 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-403 (2013); 
WIS. STAT. § 904.03 (2013). 
254.  See FED. R. EVID. 801 et seq.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
255.  Hearsay evidence that would be excluded in a federal or state proceeding may be admitted 
in an SSA proceeding. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). 
256.  20 C.F.R. § 405.1(c)(2). 
257.  FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (expert witnesses may testify as to matters of opinion if the opinion 
“will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”); Mukhtar v. Cal. 
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silent on this point yet implicitly mirrors the federal and state rules. Title 20 
C.F.R. § 405.350 states in the conditional form that the “[t]he 
administrative law judge may receive any evidence . . . that he or she 
believes relates to your claim.”258 Since the judge is vested with discretion 
to determine what relevant evidence to include or exclude, this suggests he 
or she may determine which evidence will help to adjudicate the claim. 
The broad similarity between these three evidence regimes argues that 
expert neuroscientific evidence, including evidence derived from pain 
neuroimaging, ought to be similarly admissible in federal, state, and SSA 
proceedings. States that follow Frye closely will apply the most restrictive 
standard. Yet, rigorous pain neuroimaging evidence offered for aggregate 
or educative purposes ought to pass even the Frye test in many cases. 
Although there are differences between evidence regimes that will lead 
to admissibility differences at the margin, under all three regimes, 
aggregate neuroimaging evidence of chronic pain ought to be admissible if 
offered for a relevant purpose. The following section will propose use-
cases in which pain neuroimaging could be relevant and in which it likely 
ought to be admissible under each evidence regime. It also sets forth the 
case for why neuroimaging currently ought to be admissible only for 
aggregate purposes, while pointing to a future in which scans of individual 
claimants may be sufficiently rigorous to merit admission. 
B. Recommendations on the Admissibility of Pain Neuroimaging Evidence 
This section first proposes the major categories in which neuroscience-
based evidence about chronic pain conditions may be relevant. It then 
suggests what kinds of neuroscience evidence may be sufficiently reliable 
to gain admissibility under all three evidence regimes and what kinds of 
evidence, or what claims relative to chronic pain neuroscience evidence, 
may not be sufficiently reliable to pass one or more of the federal, state, 
and SSA evidentiary thresholds. This focus on relevance first, and then 
reliability, mirrors the architecture of the Federal Rules, whose drafters 
logically suggested that relevance precedes all other considerations. 
 
State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1065 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Vallejo, 237 
F.3d 1008, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)) (expert opinion should “address an issue beyond the common 
knowledge of the average layman”); New Jersey v. Torres, 874 A.2d 1084, 1096 (N.J. 2005) 
(“[E]xpert’s testimony must be restricted to those areas that fall outside the common knowledge of 
jurors.”). 
258.  20 C.F.R. § 405.350(b) (emphasis added). 
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1. Pain Neuroimaging Is Sufficiently Reliable to Be Admitted for 
Some Purposes 
Pain neuroimaging evidence should be admissible in certain cases to 
help the finder of fact understand the nature of chronic pain diseases, to 
demonstrate general features of chronic pain diseases, and to show the 
average impact of such diseases on the neurological function of sufferers. 
Testimony grounded in structural and functional neuroimaging of chronic 
pain, when offered for these limited purposes, should satisfy the federal 
Daubert and state Frye standards (with some exceptions), as well as the 
more permissive relevance and reliability standards in SSA proceedings. 
There are several strong uses-cases for aggregate neuroimaging 
evidence in cases where chronic pain is at issue, all of which fall into the 
category of expert-as-educator. Neuroscience-based evidence relating to 
chronic pain could be offered as relevant to matters within the following 
three general categories: (a) the biology of chronic pain; (b) the cognitive 
and affective effects and implications of chronic pain; and (c) general 
debiasing, that is, correcting implicit biases or mistaken inferences 
adjudicators or jurors may draw from their own experience. Given the 
nearly limitless variety of facts in the world, and advocates’ creativity in 
working with them, these categories do not capture all potentially relevant 
uses of such evidence. The arguments in this section draw on and 
incorporate the scientific material presented in Part II, supra; accordingly, 
the supporting research is not repeated here. 
a. Relevance Case: General Biology of Chronic Pain 
Evidence grounded in neuroimaging, including brain images 
themselves, could help explain to ALJs and to jurors features of chronic 
pain that may be puzzling or counterintuitive to the non-expert. There are 
four major concepts about chronic pain that decision makers should know 
because they may be important to adjudicating a case. These four concepts 
are outside of the experience of lay jurors and ALJs; indeed, they likely are 
outside the experience even of physicians who do not practice in the 
chronic pain area. These concepts track those introduced in Part III.C, 
concerning the role of neuroimaging in changing norms, but here are not 
limited to disability and apply to any case involving chronic pain claims. 
First, experts may inform decision makers about how brain-based 
processes modulate pain experience, so that two different individuals with 
the same or similar peripheral injury may experience markedly different 
degrees and durations of pain.259 Such evidence would go to explaining the 
 
259.  See supra Part II.A. 
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“excess” pain that some individuals experience. Evidence of central 
sensitization can also aid decision makers in understanding how pain may 
persist after the apparent resolution of the original injury or disease.260 
Second, brain-based processes can cause a pain condition even in the 
absence of a discernable peripheral injury, that is, “pain without lesion.”261 
The existence of this kind of pain is the most counter-intuitive to non-
specialists and may be likely to be adjudged as fraudulent or as a form of 
factitious disorder.262 Expert testimony can explain the neurological 
mechanisms that give rise to such pain. It can also help construct a 
clinically realistic portrait of these kinds of diseases to aid the decision 
maker in coming to an accurate assessment of a particular claimant or 
plaintiff. 
Third, although all chronic pain conditions will share some 
neurological features, distinct chronic pain conditions present distinct 
patterns of brain involvement.263 Evidence on this point can aid decision 
makers in understanding the reality of pain conditions. If an opposing party 
introduces testimony to the effect that certain pain conditions, like 
fibromyalgia or chronic headache, lack a biological basis, rebuttal 
testimony about the specific neurobiology of such conditions would 
become relevant. 
Finally, chronic pain results in structural remodeling of the brain, 
although permanence or reversibility of these changes remain under 
investigation. Testimony on the degree and duration of impairment could 
go to damages in a tort case. 
b. Relevance Case: Cognitive and Affective Effects of Chronic 
Pain 
Findings from neuroimaging, along with more traditional kinds of 
evidence, can help instruct the finder of fact about the cognitive and 
emotional impacts of chronic pain. These impacts are not ephemeral nor 
epiphenomenal: They are part of the pain disorder.264 Cognitive and 
affective issues arise directly from the brain-based impairments of chronic 
pain conditions.265 Pain neuroimaging and related research show how 
specific cognitive and affective regions of the brain involved in pain 
processing become functionally and structurally altered by pain. As 
discussed infra, in Part III.B., research suggests that, when a chronic pain 
 
260.  Id. 
261.  See supra Part III.A. 
262.  See supra Part I.B. 
263.  See supra Part II.C. 
264.  See supra notes 214–218 and accompanying text. 
265.  See supra notes 214–218 and accompanying text. 
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sufferer and a typical person perform the same task in the lab, the pain 
sufferer needs to recruit different and additional brain regions to do the 
same work; the total “load” becomes higher for him or her. By analogy, 
chronic pain impairs performance on a decision or task similarly to how 
texting interferes with driving. The difference is that the chronic pain 
sufferer cannot “put down the phone.” 
Cognitive impairments may affect a claimant’s ability to work at the 
pre-illness cognitive level. The affective impairments may constitute a 
compensable harm in tort, as part of the overall evaluation of damages. 
Affective impairments also go to the question of hedonic adaptability.266 
Unlike many other forms of disability, chronic pain is unfortunately non-
adaptable: The famous behavioral economist Dan Ariely, who had an 
accident that left him with third-degree burns over most of his body, has 
written eloquently about the non-adaptability of chronic pain.267 The 
reasons for pain’s low hedonic adaptability are multiple, including that pain 
hurts. Neuroimaging revealing how pain commandeers portions of the 
brain’s emotional systems may provide an additional explanation: Mood 
cannot fully recover where the condition itself interferes with mood 
regulation. This could be relevant in a tort case to show future damages or 
to rebut a defense argument for limited damages grounded in hedonic 
adaptability. 
c. Relevance Case: Debiasing 
The experience of at least some degree of pain is universal. Pain thus 
would seem to be within the knowledge and experience of the ordinary 
juror. However, this very experience may mislead jurors. Chronic pain is 
not like acute pain. Jurors who have experienced acute pain thus may 
reason wrongly about chronic pain specifically because they are likely to 
try to understand chronic pain based on their own experience of acute pain. 
This creates a role for the expert witness as an educator about the nature of 
this misunderstood set of conditions. 
Courts have been mixed in their reception of experts as pure educators, 
as in the case of experts who testify about the fallibility of eyewitness 
 
266.  Hedonic adaptation is the notion that people adjust to illness or injury, returning relatively 
quickly to pre-injury levels of happiness. DAN GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 151–53, 227–28 
(2006); John Bronsteen el al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1516 (2008). Some scholars thus have argued that tort recoveries should be adjusted downward 
because the injured plaintiff is likely to fare better than jurors imagine. Bronsteen et al., supra. But cf. 
Peter H. Huang, Emotional Adaptation and Lawsuit Settlements, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 50 
(2008). 
267.  Dan Ariely, Painful Lessons (Jan. 30, 2008), 
http://web.mit.edu/ariely/www/MIT/Papers/mypain.pdf. 
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identification.268 Some courts have permitted experts to teach the jury about 
the fallibility of eyewitnesses, reasoning that such testimony is necessary to 
debias jurors who otherwise will give too much weight to eyewitness 
identification evidence.269 Other courts have held, conversely, that 
scientific evidence concerning visual recall and identification is not a 
proper subject for expert testimony because it is within the ordinary 
experience of jurors.270 
Testimony educating the jury about general features of chronic pain or 
specific chronic pain conditions could face similar skepticism among 
courts. However, expert testimony about chronic pain is readily 
distinguishable from education about visual identification and recall. 
Although, as with visual recall, every juror will have had experience with 
pain, most will not have had experience with serious chronic pain. This 
places chronic pain further outside the scope of juror competence than 
eyewitness identification. If the jury does contain a member who has had 
serious chronic pain, it would be more appropriate for the rest of the jury to 
be educated by parties’ experts than for there to be, in effect, a covert 
expert in the jury room who has not been subject to adversarial 
examination. 
2. Neuroimaging Should Not (Yet?) Be Admissible to Prove 
Individual Pain 
Neuroimaging techniques, particularly fMRI, should not be admissible 
at this point under federal or state standards to prove or disprove the 
presence of a chronic pain condition in any individual. The major concerns 
that render such evidence currently inadmissible are identical to those that 
must be resolved in order to allow for future admissibility. Moreover, these 
problems currently are common to all individual, non-aggregate evidentiary 
uses of all fMRI and much structural brain imaging, not just the 
neuroimaging of chronic pain. These are, in this author’s view, the 
problems of: baseline norming;271 reverse inference problems; 272 inter- and 
 
268.  Suedabeh Walker, Comment, Drawing on Daubert: Bringing Reliability to the Forefront in 
the Admissibility of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 62 EMORY L.J. 1205, 1222 n.118 (2013) (note 
and accompanying text surveying jurisdictions admitting or excluding educative testimony on the 
accuracy of eyewitness identifications). 
269.  Id. at 1222 n.118 and accompanying text; see also Eyewitness Misidentification, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http:// www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2013); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 78 (2008) 
(discussing the role of eyewitness error in wrongful convictions). 
270.  Walker, supra note 268, at 1222 n.118 and accompanying text. 
271.  Craig E.L. Stark & Larry R. Squire, When Zero Is Not Zero: The Problem of Ambiguous 
Baseline Conditions in fMRI, 98 PNAS 12760 (2001) (“[T]here is no inherent baseline associated with 
the blood oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal . . . that is measured in traditional functional MRI 
(fMRI) studies . . . .”). 
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intra-subject variation;273 high cost;274 and counter-measures (“tricking the 
scanner”).275 Each of these problems relating to the validity of scans for 
individual pain diagnosis is scientifically nontrivial. However, the 
breathtaking pace of innovation in neuroscience and in information 
processing would make it foolhardy to say “never.” 
Even if future neuroimaging protocols reduce the risk of these 
interpretive pitfalls, the legal system still should not develop a default 
expectation that parties introduce such evidence in all chronic pain cases. 
Such evidence is costly relative to other evidence that might adequately 
resolve the case. A preference for scans might prejudice decision makers 
against claimants who cannot afford the technique or whose condition 
cannot reliably be discerned that way. This could create a CSI effect, 
wherein jurors or adjudicators expect a party to produce a type of scientific 
evidence simply because it exists,276 and draw an adverse inference against 
the party if such evidence is not offered.277 Currently and in the foreseeable 
future, it would be undesirable for scientific, economic, and normative 
reasons for adjudicators and fact finders to develop an expectation that 
neuroimaging should be introduced to prove pain. 
CONCLUSION 
At the same time that chronic pain is pervasive across important areas 
of law, the law incorporates deep bias and confusion about what chronic 
pain consists of and even whether it is “real.” Generations of patients and 
courtroom claimants with chronic pain have been told that their condition is 
“all in their heads.” Legal doctrines, including judge-made law interpreting 
the Social Security Disability regulations, encode these pejorative 
characterizations, which are grounded in part in skepticism about pain, an 
invisible and largely unverifiable condition, and in part in a Freudian-
 
272.  Russell A. Poldrack, Can Cognitive Processes Be Inferred from Neuroimaging Data, 10 
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 59, 59 (2006) (“This is a ‘reverse inference’,  in that it reasons backwards 
from the presence of brain activation to the engagement of a particular cognitive function.”). 
273.  Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for 
Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 382 (2007) (“Inter-subject variability is also a 
consideration. . . . [T]wo independent subjects [may] show different patterns of activation while their 
behavioral performances are comparable.”). 
274.  National Research Council, The Polygraph and Lie Detection, NAT’L ACAD. PRESS (2003), 
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10420. (“fMRI is not presently useful” for 
studying individual differences because “fMRI analysis is expensive and time-consuming”). 
275.  Greely & Illes, supra note 273, at 404–05 (“Simple movements of the tongue or jaw will 
make fMRI scans unreadable. . . . simply thinking about other things during a task may activate other 
brain regions in ways that interfere . . . .”). 
276.  Durnal, supra note 208, at 1. 
277.  See id. at 5. 
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inflected construction of the chronic pain sufferer as the modern-day 
hysteric. 
Although not providing a pain-o-meter that will separate the honest 
pain sufferer from the malingering fraudster, neuroimaging and other 
technologies can play a positive role in helping to change norms, to inform 
interpretation of existing laws and regulations, and contribute to 
establishing new legal standards. These technologies may never produce 
definitive measurements of pain and its and associated distress. And, they 
may not fully surmount the problem of pain’s incommensurability across 
subjects. Yet, they can shed light on pain’s mechanisms and neurological 
bases. This should allow fact finders and decision makers to recognize 
chronic pain in the courtroom, should allow judges to better interpret 
regulations and doctrines relating to chronic pain, and should lead to the 
revision of relevant regulations to provide greater guidance on when a 
person may be disabled by chronic pain. 
The ability to partially measure and objectify pain both will and will 
not resolve difficult legal questions that turn on pain’s presence and 
intensity in individual cases. This is because, even if neuroimaging could 
validate pain’s presence and severity perfectly, legal actors still would need 
to determine when pain, and what kinds of pain, constitute a legally-
redressable impairment. Further, although new pain science and pain 
imaging are powerful, they are not a panacea for every legal doctrine or 
issue that appears to involve pain. Certain legal doctrines and statuses 
appear to be framed in terms of pain’s presence and amount, yet cannot be 
understood fully through better measurement of pain. Debates carried out 
in part through competing statements about pain—like whether a pre-viable 
fetus feels pain, or whether certain execution protocols are so painful as to 
violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription on cruel and unusual 
punishment—may in large part be coded conversations about values; not, 
as they purport to be, primarily about physical facts. Thus pain imaging and 
measurement would misdirect rather than illuminate, allowing decision 
makers to dodge fundamental normative issues about the relationship 
between citizen and state, person and person.278 
As neuroimaging develops, the law will confront challenging questions 
that emerge from pain, such as whether it can sustain its different treatment 
of physical pain and emotional pain. Physical pain is always also an 
emotional experience, and emotional pain is always produced by and 
experienced in the body. All subjective states emerge from neural 
substrates and have physiological correlates. In providing a window into 
the subjective experiences the brain generates in pain, the neuroimaging of 
 
278.  A.C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral 
Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (2012). 
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pain should lead to doctrinal and practice-based revisions that increase 
law’s accuracy and fairness. Beyond that, understanding pain may require 
the law to rethink its current dualism between physical and emotional 
states, and its privileging of the body as real and valid over the emotions as 
excessively inchoate and soft, allowing the law to begin to comprehend the 
mind in the body and the body in the mind. 
